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Abstract 
 As a conceptual replication of Tincher, Lebois, and Barsalou (2016), I investigated the 
effects of a brief mindfulness intervention on two measures related to intergroup bias: language 
abstraction and the differential attribution of uniquely-human emotions to different groups. In 
Experiment 1, 207 politically liberal or conservative participants were randomly assigned to a 
mindful attention, immersed attention, or no instruction condition. Participants were exposed to a 
series of visual and auditory stimuli, including several pictures of valenced behavior performed 
by an ingroup or an outgroup member. They were also asked to indicate which emotions are 
characteristic of typical ingroup and outgroup members. Experiment 2 had more participants (N 
= 265) and introduced several design improvements but was otherwise identical in method. In 
neither study was the Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB) effect elicited, even within control 
conditions (i.e., there was no LIB effect for mindful attention to attenuate). Mindful attention 
also did not affect the emotion-attribution measure of infrahumanization, which occurred across 
all conditions in both experiments. However, an unanticipated effect was replicated in both 
experiments: liberals infrahumanized conservatives, but conservatives’ infrahumanization of 
liberals was much weaker and not statistically significant. Discussion focuses on the challenges 
and importance of replication in social psychology, the nature and challenge of brief mindfulness 
manipulations, and the implications of infrahumanizing political rivals, particularly among 
liberals in today’s combative political climate.  
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Mindfulness and Implicit Political Intergroup Bias 
The ability to observe without evaluating is the highest form of intelligence. This 
assertion, expressed in various ways by the philosopher and spiritual teacher Jiddu Krishnamurti 
(e.g., Krishnamurti, 1991, p. 152,158, 264-265), captures the distinctive character of 
mindfulness, a term that has become increasingly familiar in western culture and academic 
scholarship. Krishamurti’s description implies a model of intelligence that is noteworthy because 
of what it omits—e.g., judgment, knowledge-acquisition, reasoning, goal-directed behavior, and 
social interaction—features historically emphasized in many Western lay and academic 
conceptions of intelligence (Cianciolo & Sternberg, 2008; Sternberg, 2000a). In placing primacy 
on the act of dispassionate observation, teachers such as Krishnamurti suggest a kind of meta-
knowledge, derived from direct experience and spontaneous insight, and in which the contents of 
the mind—thoughts, emotions, beliefs, goals, memories—are mere objects of present-moment 
attention. From this perspective, the mind, and even the self, is essentially no different from, say, 
the color of the sunset or the sound of rain; they are all arising and passing phenomena, devoid of 
essential or permanent ontological status. Practitioners of meditation often describe the practice 
as leading to a state of “awakening,” compared to the relative “delusion” of habitual concepts 
and categorization. The key observational technique from meditative practice, mindfulness, has 
consequently been a subject of considerable interest among philosophers and social scientists. 
While the study of mindfulness has been a common feature of the clinical psychology 
and medical literature for the past three decades, it has received comparatively less attention 
among sociologists and social psychologists (Karremans & Papies, 2017; Lee, 2015). For 
example, as of this writing, a search for the term “mindfulness” in article titles and abstracts in 
the sociology database SocINDEX results in 840 entries, compared to 9,632 entries in the 
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PsychINFO psychology database. Additionally, searches conducted via the publishers’ websites 
for the term “mindfulness” in the title or abstracts of articles within Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology, The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, The Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, and Personality and Social Psychology Review—some of 
social psychology’s premiere research journals—results in only 51 articles. One consequence of 
the lack of social-psychological attention to mindfulness is that the bulk of empirical work has 
focused on either relatively asocial and individual-level outcomes (e.g., anxiety, stress, 
depression, coping, healthy behaviors, self-esteem) or to dyadic interpersonal processes and, to a 
lesser extent, organizational/workplace performance (Barnes, Brown, Krusemark, Campbell, & 
Rogge, 2007; Creswell, 2017; Good et al., 2016; Goyal et al., 2014; Kabat‐Zinn, 2003; Laurent, 
Hertz, Nelson, & Laurent, 2016; Sedlmeier et al., 2012). While these types of psychological and 
group outcomes are undoubtedly important, a disproportionate focus on them can undergird a 
type of common critique made against mindfulness practices like meditation, especially in 
contexts in which it is secularized or “corporatized” in mainstream culture: that inner-directed 
transformative work may ultimately distract attention away from efforts to achieve structural 
change and social justice (Comstock, 2015; Lee, 2015; Moore, 2016; Rowe, 2016). Stated 
another way, meditation might make you more productive and content, but it is useless for 
resolving or fundamentally transforming intergroup conflict and oppression. If this argument is 
true, then Krishamurti’s notion of intelligence holds little relevance for addressing phenomena 
such as prejudice or political intolerance. Given its focus on intraindividual processes in 
interpersonal and intergroup contexts, social psychology may be a more useful approach than 
clinical psychology or medicine for testing whether mindfulness can help to quell intergroup 
conflict and/or intergroup oppression. However, the concept of mindfulness is only just now 
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beginning to be integrated into the existing theoretical frameworks of social psychology, and 
there exists very little independent social psychological theorizing that explicates the various 
mechanisms of mindfulness or how they relate to social processes (Karremans & Papies, 2017). 
(There are some notable exceptions, such the work of Ellen Langer and colleagues, and those are 
briefly discussed in the next section.) 
The aim of the present research was to replicate and extend the findings of an experiment 
by Tincher, Lebois, and Barsalou (2016), which demonstrated a statistically significant reduction 
in the Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB) effect after a brief laboratory mindfulness intervention. I 
chose a conceptual replication attempt rather than a newly-formulated research question for two 
reasons. First, Tincher et al.’s experiment represents a growing, but nascent, focus area within 
social psychology. In such initial stages of research, it is often useful to seek corroborating 
evidence of a basic finding rather than contribute to a profusion of single studies that all have 
different methods and outcome measures. Second, the present research was inspired in part by 
continuing disquietude among social psychologists regarding low statistical power, publication 
bias, and failed replications across many studies and domains (e.g., Earp & Trafimow, 2015; 
Maxwell, 2004; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). By 
attempting an independent replication of Tincher et al.’s experiment, I was following recent 
prescriptions for more direct and conceptual replication within social psychology (Earp & 
Trafimow, 2015) while also attempting to connect their findings to a broader ecological context, 
namely that of contentious political partisanship. 
In the sections that follow, I briefly review research on the construct of mindfulness, with 
special attention to how it has been applied to topics such as social cognition, intergroup bias, 
and intergroup relations. I then describe Tincher et al.’s (2016) experiment in more detail and 
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provide a brief review of the LIB effect. Finally, I provide an overview of the present research, 
highlighting my methodological extensions relative to the original Tincher et al. experiment.   
Mindfulness: A Social Psychological Review 
A common definition of mindfulness is that it represents a state of paying conscious 
attention to present-moment experiences with a curious and non-judgmental attitude (Kabat-
Zinn, 1990; Karremans & Papies, 2017). While it has roots in religious contemplative practices, 
particularly those of Buddhism and Hinduism, Kabat-Zinn (1990) was the first to offer an 
operational definition that was stripped of its religious metaphysical content and thus more 
conducive to psychological research. Others then began to refine and formalize the concept. 
Bishop et al. (2004), for example, suggested that mindfulness is distinct from other kinds of self-
focused attention such as rumination or preoccupation. He presented a two-component model to 
describe the distinct features of a mindful approach to phenomena: (a) focusing attention on 
present-moment experiences, including bodily sensations, thoughts, and emotional states; and (b) 
approaching these experiences with a nonjudgmental attitude, irrespective of their valence. The 
second of these components is thought to be especially important, since it can often lead to the 
insight that all perceptual phenomena are transient experiences, having no fixed, unchanging, or 
inherent “essence,” but rather representing slices of a continual ebb and flow of causes and 
effects. This insight, in turn, can lead to an attentional perspective shift, most commonly referred 
to as “decentering.” To decenter means to stand outside of one’s own experience perceptually, 
taking the perspective of a dispassionate observer. Instead of unconsciously identifying with a 
thought or emotion, such that one is not even aware of the process of thinking or feeling but of 
their experiential products, one stands outside of the thought or feeling, seeing these 
psychological processes as such, and realizing that these phenomena are separate from the 
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observing self. To go back to Krishamurti’s claim, one is not “evaluating” as such, but rather one 
is aware that one is evaluating, which is quite different. 
Davidson (2010, p. 10) explicates emotional responses from a decentered perspective: 
“Mindfulness training can be hypothesized to change an individual’s relationship to his or her 
emotions so that they are not viewed as fundamental constituents of self, but rather as more 
fleeting phenomena that appear to the self.” Sedlmeier et al. (2012) note that this has been 
referred to by a variety of terms, such as decentering, cognitive defusion, deautomatization, and 
disidentification. What all these terms ultimately refer to is a type of perspective-shift that results 
in “decoupling the normative relationships between internal experiences and other internal/overt 
behavior” (Levin, Luoma, & Haeger, 2015, p. 870). In phenomenological schools of philosophy, 
this is similar to the process known as “bracketing,” but in mindfulness it is not so much an 
analytical concept as it is an experiential one. The emphasis is on what one empirically realizes 
about the nature of phenomena: that there is constant change, no immutable boundaries, and 
therefore, an interconnectedness of all things, even things that are seemingly oppositional. This 
can be contrasted with an orientation to phenomena in which one assumes that one’s subjective 
construals represent the way things “really are,” and that other perspectives must be biased or 
incorrect, an orientation that Ross and Ward (1996) termed naïve realism. In juxtaposition, 
mindfulness can lead to reduced realism in the sense that one understands that any phenomenon 
has multiple perspectives from which it can be viewed; thus, we are all biased, to some extent. 
From its religious origins, mindfulness is ultimately about the causes of suffering, and 
about freedom from it. The reduced subjective realism and reduced emotional reactivity to 
phenomena that are characteristic of mindful states reflect the fact that it ultimately involves a 
separation between one’s self and one’s experiences, a separation that highlights one’s freedom 
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to respond to experience intentionally versus automatically. Lawrence Barsalou (2017) draws a 
parallel between this aspect of intentional versus automatic response in mindfulness and the 
various dual-process theories that have arisen in the fields of cognitive and social psychology 
over the last several decades. He suggests that the dual-process model of cognition “fits naturally 
with contemplative practices” (p. 2) because these practices were designed with the often-
explicit goal of offering regulatory and reflective tools to counteract habitual, impulsive 
cognitive responses. Thus, they can be seen as strengthening “System 2,” or conscious and 
controlled, processing, and weakening “System 1,” or implicit and involuntary, processing. 
Along similar lines, Elkins-Brown, Teper, and Inzlicht (2017) review evidence that mindfulness 
is associated with increased self-control, especially the inhibition of prepotent responses and 
desires. They suggest that conflicts between goals and desires often produce negative affect (e.g., 
anxiety), and that mindful attention draws conscious and non-judgmental awareness to this 
affect. This, in turn, disrupts automatic responses to the affect and allows one to engage in more 
controlled, goal-congruent behavior. 
Although the model of mindfulness deriving from Kabat-Zinn (1990) and Bishop et al. 
(2004) has become the dominant one within psychological and social-psychological research, 
they are not the only theoretical models of mindfulness that have been proposed. A notable 
alternative comes the work of Ellen Langer and colleagues, who as early as 1974 developed a 
theory of mindfulness and “mindlessness” that is similar to, but also very distinct from, the 
construct of mindfulness reviewed above. Sternberg (2000b), for example, summarizes Langer’s 
construct of mindfulness as “containing components of (a) openness to novelty; (b) alertness to 
distinction; (c) sensitivity to different contexts; (d) implicit, if not explicit, awareness of multiple 
perspectives; and (e) orientation in the present” (p. 12). Langer & Moldoveanu (2000) further 
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state that mindfulness is “best understood as the process of drawing novel distinctions” (p. 1), 
and their construct has been used as a means of investigating mindful approaches to learning, 
task performance, and decision-making (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000). 
A further example of an alternative model of mindfulness was introduced in a paper by 
Van Doesum, Van Lange, & Van Lange (2013). The authors developed a construct of “social 
mindfulness,” which they define as a desire to maximize other people’s control over their own 
outcomes in situations of interdependence. While models such as Langer’s and Van Doesum et 
al.’s are instructive, they also have marked conceptual differences from the bulk of psychological 
research on mindfulness that I reviewed. Therefore, neither of these approaches were used as 
theoretical frameworks for this research. 
Mindfulness instruction and measurement. Traditionally, mindfulness has been 
studied using a paradigm of an eight-week training program in which participants learn explicit 
theories and practices of mindfulness meditation (Alberts, 2017). In these programs, participants 
are typically provided with weekly instruction and asked to practice daily outside of training 
sessions. This paradigm has the advantage of mimicking how one might learn a meditative 
practice in a non-research setting, and it allows the opportunity to carry a mindful orientation 
into daily activities as well as formal practice sessions. Such training programs have been 
associated with a variety of improvements to clinically-relevant psychological outcomes.1 More 
recently, psychologists have been interested in inducing mindful attentional states in laboratory 
settings, which allows more methodological control and precise measurement of the 
psychological processes that are involved when mindful attention is used. It also, however, raises 
the question of whether, and exactly how, a state of mindfulness can be brought about, and 
whether an attentional state is fundamentally the same kind of psychological “thing” as a longer-
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term practice or orientation. For example, if a person who has never meditated before or who has 
never heard of mindfulness is asked to listen to a 10-minute guided mindfulness meditation, how 
is one to assess whether that person has attained a state of mindfulness? And, once attained, are 
these temporary states psychologically equivalent to the kind of mindful cognitive orientation 
attained by skilled meditators?  
These kinds of questions naturally highlight the need for assessment tools to measure, as 
well as possible, the degree of one’s mindfulness. As the above paragraph might suggest, 
assessment tools fall into two basic categories: those designed to measure “state” mindfulness, 
and those designed to measure “trait,” or dispositional, mindfulness (for reviews, see Baer, 
Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006; Baer, 2016; Lau et al., 2006; Park, Reilly-Spong, 
& Gross, 2013). While both categories consist almost exclusively of self-report measures, they 
are distinguished by the former’s focus on the present moment (or immediate past) and the 
latter’s focus on general tendencies or daily habit patterns. While such assessment tools are open 
to the same kind of criticism that can be made of any self-report measure of psychological 
process, they have had at least one major beneficial effect on the study of mindfulness: the need 
for adequate discriminant validity has forced researchers to think more critically about exactly 
what the construct of mindfulness is. There is a growing consensus, for example, that 
mindfulness is best conceptualized in a multidimensional way. One of the more widely-used trait 
mindfulness scales is called the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ, Baer et al., 2006; 
Baer et al., 2008), and it includes subscales for the following components of mindfulness: 
observing, describing, acting with awareness, nonjudging of inner experience, and nonreactivity 
to inner experience. It is perhaps noteworthy that in these assessments, the content and social 
context of the respondent’s inner experience is not specified. For example, it is difficult to know 
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from an FFMQ assessment whether one tends to be differentially mindful when alone or with 
others, nor whether mindfulness in different contexts tends to be differentially difficult and/or 
effective for facilitating positive social interaction. 
Mindfulness and intergroup relations. Rowe (2016) writes about his experience 
interviewing activists in New York City who were participating in the Occupy Wall Street 
movement after he had read that many of them were using daily group mindfulness meditation 
and other mind/body practices to support their activist work. Based on his interviews, he posits 
five central ways that these kinds of practices can strengthen social movements (p. 209): 
“helping activists prepare for direct action, improving self-care/resilience, transforming trauma, 
embodying liberatory values and habits, and improving organizational effectiveness.” Of 
particular relevance to the present research is the notion of embodying liberatory values. Rowe 
suggests that “mind/body practices such as meditation can help activists notice embodied 
thought-patterns and behaviors that interrupt the pursuit of justice” (p. 218). While Rowe was not 
experimentally testing a hypothesis, his finding that activists considered mindfulness to be 
relevant to their peace work suggests that further empirical investigation is warranted. For 
example, can mindful attention to one’s judgments of others reduce the influence of bias on 
behavior, and, if so, is this only true if the relevant thoughts/beliefs are consciously attended to, 
or might mindful attention more generally allow a person to be less influenced by implicit biases 
of any kind, irrespective of whether they are consciously processed? Which specific domains of 
intergroup bias or conflict might be most relevant to the kind of emotional regulation and self-
control that mindfulness is thought to influence? 
Along these lines, Berry and Brown (2017) provide a review of the sparse social 
psychological experimental literature on mindfulness and intergroup relations and perception.2 
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They present summaries of several lines of research, observing that “mindfulness fosters non-
defensive attitudes toward social outgroup members in three domains: worldview threat, 
linguistic intergroup bias, and automatic implicit bias” (p. 156). For example, they review a 
study by Niemiec et al. (2010) that showed lower outgroup derogation and lower ingroup 
favoritism—both in terms of race and national identity—among dispositionally-mindful 
compared to non-dispositionally mindful participants after they were exposed to a mortality-
salience manipulation. They also review a study by Lueke and Gibson (2015), which 
demonstrated decreased implicit age and race bias (as measured by the Implicit Association Test, 
or IAT) after exposure to a 10-minute auditory-based mindfulness intervention. In this 
experiment, the dependent measure consisted of reaction times to photographs of Black versus 
White and young versus old faces. It included two control conditions: a group that listened (with 
no particular attentional instructions) to a recording that described an English countryside, and 
another group that listened to the control recording with explicit instructions to pay close 
attention to a particular spoken word. The same authors (Lueke & Gibson, 2016) conducted a 
follow-up experiment that indicated reductions in discriminatory behavior in a laboratory “trust 
game” after a similar 10-minute mindfulness intervention. Their dependent measure was the 
amount of fictional money participants were willing to give to people of different races and 
ethnicities when the participants did not know whether the money would be returned. The 
experiment included one control condition that consisted of a “filler” audio-recording, similar to 
their 2015 experiment. In both the 2015 and 2016 experiments, bias measurements were 
completed only once, after the experimental manipulation. Notably, however, in both 
experiments, Lueke and Gibson asked all participants—in both experimental and control 
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conditions—to complete measures of trait and/or state mindfulness after the manipulation, which 
may have influenced control participants’ later responses. 
  Berry and Brown (2017) also reviewed a series of experimental studies they conducted 
that revealed an association between mindfulness and empathic concern and helping behavior, 
though as of this writing none of those studies are part of the published record. Of these various 
lines of incipient research reviewed by Berry and Brown (2017), the 2016 experiment by Tincher 
et al. is most relevant to my present research. A summary of their experiment is provided here, in 
which I begin by describing the LIB effect in more detail. 
The Linguistic Intergroup Bias effect was introduced by Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, and Semin 
(1989), and it refers to the tendency for people to use more abstract language when describing a 
positive behavior performed by a member of the person’s ingroup, or when describing a negative 
behavior performed by a member of the person’s outgroup. The underlying theoretical 
framework of this effect is that of the Linguistic Category Model (LCM) (Semin & Fiedler, 
1991). The LCM makes a distinction between five categories of interpersonal terms, namely 
Descriptive Action Verbs (DAV), Interpretative Action Verbs (IAV), State Action Verbs (SAV), 
State Verbs (SV), and Adjectives (ADJ). Each category is progressively less concrete or 
descriptive and more abstract or attributional. For example, Semin (2012) provides the following 
illustration: A DAV category might be represented by the phrase “A punches B;” the same action 
might be described by the IAV phrase “A hurts B;” a yet more abstract description would be the 
SAV phrase “A hates B;” and the most abstract characterization would be an ADV phrase such 
as “A is aggressive.” In this example, the hypothetical perceiver gives the same action different 
interpretations, ones that progress from an emphasis on specific observable events to ones in 
which general classes of behaviors or general psychological dispositions are highlighted. The 
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LCM posits that language is a cognitive tool used to direct attention to specific aspects of the 
environment, and that it implicitly conveys information about the perceiver’s causal inferences 
and interpretations.  
According to the LCM, abstract language can signify category-based cognition (i.e., 
stereotyped thinking). Thus, language abstraction in an intergroup context is thought to be a 
subtle form of implicit stereotyping or bias, and since Maass et al.’s original (1989) publication 
on the LIB effect, a growing body of evidence has associated the LIB effect with both ingroup 
protection motives as well as differential expectancies. That is, people tend to use more abstract 
language as a means of protecting their ingroup identities and esteem, as well as when describing 
phenomena that are expected, such as when employing a stereotype (Maass, Milesi, Zabbini, & 
Stahlberg, 1995; Maass, Ceccarelli, & Rudin, 1996; Maass, 1999). 
Tincher et al. (2016) sought to examine whether mindfulness could reduce this type of 
linguistic bias. To test this, they randomly assigned 84 college students to one of four groups: a 
mindful attention/friend group, a mindful attention/enemy group, an immersed attention/friend 
group, and an immersed attention/enemy group. The “friend” and enemy” refers to whether the 
target person in visual stimuli they were exposed to was either the participant’s imagined “best 
friend” or “worst enemy.” In other words, when viewing a series of pictures, the participants 
were asked to imagine that the person depicted in the picture was their best friend or worst 
enemy. The immersed attention condition was distinct from mindful attention condition in that 
the former group was instructed to immerse themselves in the visual stimuli and try to “live the 
event” that was pictured, whereas the latter group was instructed to use an “observing 
perspective” and to notice the transient nature of their thoughts and feelings while they viewed 
the same stimuli. Participants were shown cartoon pictures of a target person engaging in diverse 
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types of actions (pictures used in prior LIB research, Douglas & Sutton, 2003; Franco & Maass, 
1996; Franco & Maass, 1999; Maass et al., 1995). The depicted actions were balanced such that 
half of them were positively-valenced (i.e., pro-social) and half were negatively-valenced (i.e., 
anti-social). Some examples of depicted behaviors included picking up trash in a park, hitting 
someone, and helping an elderly person across the street. Participants were shown each picture 
on a computer screen for 10 seconds, after which a set of four response options appeared 
underneath the picture. The four options corresponded to increasingly abstract descriptions of the 
behavior, in accordance with the LCM and previous LIB literature (Douglas & Sutton, 2003; 
Franco & Maass, 1996; Franco & Maass, 1999). 
The authors found that, although the LIB effect could still be observed among the 
mindful attention group, it only appeared for positively-valenced behavior (as opposed to both 
positive and negative behaviors in the immersed attention condition). Moreover, within positive 
behaviors, the LIB effect was significantly attenuated relative to the immersed attention group 
(the effect size for the mindful attention condition was gs = 2.15, versus gs = 0.79 for the 
immersed attention condition). The authors also found a main effect of condition, such that 
participants in the mindful attention group tended to give more concrete descriptive ratings 
across target group and behavior valence. These findings held both for participants who had no 
prior meditation experience and for those who had. 
One important thing to note about most of the studies reviewed by Berry and Brown 
(2017), including the experiment by Tincher et al. (2016), is their small sample sizes relative to 
the number of conditions in their experimental designs; this raises the concern of low statistical 
power. This concern is exacerbated by the fact that little prior empirical or theoretical work can 
guide estimates of effect sizes in this area; if effect sizes are small, then small samples will result 
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in substantially low statistical power. The Niemiec et al. (2010) experiments, for example, had 
32 participants per cell in Study 1 and 54 participants per cell in Study 2, using between-subjects 
designs in both studies. The Lueke and Gibson (2015) experiment had 28 participants per cell in 
a one-factor between-subjects design while their 2016 experiment had a final sample of 31 
participants per cell in a mixed design. The Tincher et al. (2016) experiment only included 21 
participants per cell in a one-factor (four-level) between-subjects design. On the one hand, it is 
possible to argue that if reliable differences between conditions in these experiments obtained 
with small sample sizes, then the effect size is likely to be large and therefore should be robust 
(see, for example Pashler & Harris, 2012, who address a similar argument). On the other hand, 
the law of large numbers implies that one should believe more in effects garnered with larger Ns 
than those with smaller Ns (Fraley & Vazire, 2014; Funder et al., 2014; Simmons et al., 2011). If 
it is the case that there are many unpublished similar experiments with no reliable effects, then 
one must entertain the hypothesis that these published studies with small Ns are the exception 
rather than the rule (Pashler & Harris, 2012). This would lead one to conclude that the true effect 
size is small to nil. The ambiguity in how to interpret initial results is a strong argument for 
replication, and this partially motivated the present research. 
The Present Research 
The primary goal of the present set of experiments was to perform a conceptual 
replication of the basic effect that was observed in Tincher et al.’s experiment. However, I also 
wanted to extend their method in several important respects. First, Tincher et al.’s experiment 
used an LIB paradigm that is arguably not intergroup in nature. That is, they asked participants to 
view cartoon-picture stimuli that represented their “best friend” or “worst enemy.” This approach 
was first introduced by researchers who wanted to see if the LIB effect extended beyond the 
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boundaries of intergroup categories to the interpersonal level (Douglas & Sutton, 2003; Maass, 
1999). While it could be argued that one’s best friend is likely to be a member of one’s own 
social group and one’s worst enemy is an outgroup member, it is not always true. I therefore 
wanted to use an actual intergroup context, and I wanted to use one that was associated with 
relatively intense feelings of hostility, competition, or conflict, since larger LIB effects have 
emerged in such contexts in prior research (Maass et al., 1996; Maass, 1999). Given that this 
research was being designed at a time characterized by intense political polarization in the 
United States—to take just one example, an extremely contentious US presidential campaign and 
election was underway—I decided to focus on political ideology as a group membership 
distinction (i.e., liberal vs. conservative group belonging). 
A second methodological extension involved the dependent measures. Although Tincher 
et al.’s study was limited to the LIB effect, I wanted to see if a similar effect could be observed 
for a related, but distinct, intergroup bias outcome. I chose a phenomenon known as 
infrahumanization, which refers to the tendency for ingroup members to consider outgroup 
members as less human than their own group, either explicitly (e.g., derogating an outgroup as 
“animals” or animal-like) or implicitly through subtle cues (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Leyens 
et al., 2001; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007). Infrahumanization is 
considered to be a variant or sub-class of a broader phenomenon known as dehumanization, and 
a great deal of empirical and theoretical development has occurred in this area over the last two 
decades (for recent reviews, see Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Haslam & Stratemeyer, 2016; Vaes, 
Leyens, Paola Paladino, & Pires Miranda, 2012). The theoretical model of infrahumanization is 
one in which ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation are combined through a person’s 
assumptions of psychological essentialism, or the belief that social groups are defined by 
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essential substance rather than by contingency or social construction. Because of this, the same 
underlying motives thought to drive the LIB effect (viz., ingroup-protection and intergroup 
expectancies) could also motivate one to infrahumanize outgroups, since both phenomena rely 
on essentialist beliefs about the inherent nature of groups. Moreover, the emphases in 
mindfulness on non-judgment and the deconstruction of essentialist beliefs should, in theory, 
directly undermine this foundation and should lead one to view others in more concrete and 
“objective” terms (e.g., we are all uniquely human and no group is inherently inclined to be good 
or bad or to necessarily behave in good or bad ways). 
A search of the literature revealed at least two recent investigations of 
infrahumanization/dehumanization of political outgroup members. Pacilli, Roccato, Pagliaro, and 
Russo (2016) found in a community-based correlational study and an experiment that level of 
political ingroup identification (i.e., left- and right-wing groups in Italy) and the salience of the 
ingroup membership influenced explicit animalistic dehumanization of the outgroup, and that 
this was mediated through perceptions of greater moral distance between the ingroup and 
outgroup. In another study using different methods and a different theoretical model of 
dehumanization, Crawford, Modri, and Motyl (2013) found that participants applied Human 
Nature (HN) and Human Uniqueness (HU) traits in different ways to liberals versus 
conservatives, and that these attributions mirrored common political stereotypes. Both liberals 
and conservatives more strongly associated their ingroup with stereotype-consistent positive 
traits (e.g., “Passionate” and “Trusting” for liberals; “Humble” and “Organized” for 
conservatives) and their outgroup with stereotype-consistent negative traits (e.g., “Nervous” and 
“Aggressive” for liberals; “Cold” and “Stingy” for conservatives).  
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Considering these studies, and the fact that Leyens et al. (2007) report that 
infrahumanization effects have been found in contexts ranging as widely as minimal group 
paradigms to competing university departments, it seemed reasonable to expect at least some 
amount of infrahumanization of political rivals in contemporary US culture. For the present 
study, I decided to use a relatively simple version of the infrahumanization paradigm, wherein 
the participant is asked to assign words that convey primary emotions (i.e., those common to all 
animals) and secondary emotions (i.e., uniquely-human) to the ingroup and outgroup. A bias in 
assigning more relatively primary versus secondary emotions to the outgroup than one does to 
the ingroup is taken as evidence of infrahumanization (Leyens et al., 2007). This measure is 
considered implicit because participants do not spontaneously infer which emotions are generally 
considered primary and secondary by the lay public. Infrahumanization is said to occur when the 
participant assigns fewer secondary emotions to the outgroup, thereby assigning them less 
emotional sophistication and nuance (i.e., more like animals). 
A third methodological difference of the present research from Tincher et al.’s study 
involves the experimental control conditions. Whereas Tincher et al. used a mindful attention 
condition compared to an immersed attention condition, I added an additional no treatment 
control condition (i.e., participants who went through the same procedure, but did not receive 
any attentional instructions to follow related to the stimuli). This additional control allows 
several alternative hypotheses concerning Tincher et al.’s experiment to be addressed, such as 
that being immersed in the stimuli increases the LIB and infrahumanization effects, rather than 
mindful attention decreasing them. It is useful to consider both types of controls, especially 
immersion since it represents an “active” control, where the participant thoroughly and closely 
processes the stimuli, but differs only in the specific attentional component of interest. Moreover, 
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in real-world contexts, conflict-prone or hostile intergroup relations are often characterized by 
immersive experiences of rumination, emotional reactivity, and sometimes complete personal 
fusion with the ingroup (Borders, Earleywine, & Jajodia, 2010; Fredman et al., 2015; Keltner & 
Lerner, 2010). 
The final methodological extension involved the frequency of attentional practice trials 
and the presence versus absence of specific instructions immediately prior to the critical stimuli. 
Tincher et al.’s study only used one set of practice stimuli for the LIB, and they instructed 
participants to apply their attentional instructions explicitly to the critical stimuli. In the present 
studies, I provided more opportunities to practice the attentional instructions prior to the 
presentation of the critical stimuli, and I did so using a wider variety of stimulus modalities (e.g., 
pictures, audio, and text). In addition, while participants were reminded of their attentional 
instructions prior to viewing the LIB stimuli, they were not reminded prior to the subsequent 
infrahumanization stimuli. These modifications arguably increase the strength of the mindfulness 
manipulation and offer the opportunity to observe a “carryover” effect from the instructions. 
Experiment 1 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether a mindfulness intervention would 
reduce linguistic intergroup bias and infrahumanization toward political outgroup members. The 
experiment consisted of a mixed factorial experimental design, with one between-subjects factor 
(attentional instructions) and three within-subjects factors (the group-membership of the target 
stimulus, the positive/negative valence of the stimuli, and, for the infrahumanization measure, 
the type of emotion selected). Participants were assigned to one of three instruction conditions to 
compare mindfulness with two other control conditions, and then practiced those instructions 
with exposure to evocative photographs. Following that, they completed two measures of 
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intergroup bias. The dependent variables were the degree of language abstraction used to 
describe ingroup vs. outgroup valenced behaviors, and the participants’ distribution of primary 
versus secondary emotional attributions toward their ingroup versus outgroup. All data were 
collected on individual computer terminals in a psychology laboratory. 
Method 
Sample and participant selection. I did not conduct a formal power analysis to 
determine sample size for either of the two experiments in this research because the published 
literature is too sparse to be sure of an effect size. My strategy was rather to choose a reasonably-
large sample size relative to prior research in this area while balancing time and resource 
constraints. Thus, the intended sample size was 180 participants, or 60 per cell for the three-
level, between-subjects factor. The final sample was larger than this target, though this increase 
was not due to extensions of stopping rules or attempts to achieve statistical significance, but 
rather the desire to achieve the largest sample within the available time. 
Two hundred nine students, recruited from an undergraduate participant pool at a large 
public northeastern university in the United States, participated in the study in exchange for 
course credit. Recruitment and data collection took place during the month of April, 2017. 
During recruitment, a prescreen filter was used to exclude from eligibility those who had 
previously reported no political affiliation during a mass prescreening session held during the 
first week of the semester (i.e., those who answered neither to the question “When it comes to 
politics in general, where do you place yourself on this scale?” (Response options included 
extremely liberal, quite liberal, slightly liberal, neither, slightly conservative, quite conservative, 
extremely conservative). While the participant’s political ingroup was not an explicit factor in the 
experimental design—I was interested in the distinction between one’s political ingroup and 
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outgroup and not between liberals and conservatives per se—the disproportionate number of 
liberals in the participant pool created the possibility that the sample would be very highly 
skewed toward liberals. Thus, to ensure that I had a reasonable number of conservatives in the 
sample, I used two different recruitment efforts, one directed at conservative participants and one 
directed at liberals. Note that this did not result in an equal n between groups, however. 
Of the 209 who participated, two participants were excluded from data analysis. One 
participant did not complete the entire experiment, so those data were excluded. A second 
participant was excluded because of obvious straight-lining in their responses across all 
questions. In addition, a third participant completed the experiment twice, so the data from that 
participant’s second instance were excluded. Removing these three participant records resulted in 
a final sample of 207 participants (60.4% female; Mage = 19.2 years, SDage = 2.4 years, age range: 
17-49 years). Of the 207 participants, 56 (27.1%) self-identified as conservative and 151 (73.0%) 
self-identified as liberal. Participants were all randomly assigned to one of the three experimental 
conditions, and due to the three aforementioned exclusions, this led to a slightly imbalanced 
design: n = 70 in the no instruction condition; n = 68 in the immersion condition; and n = 69 in 
the mindfulness condition. 
Nineteen participants (9.2%) failed at least one attention check that had been included in 
the experiment (e.g., a dummy question asking participants to select a specific response option, 
etc.). All analyses were conducted by both including and excluding these 19 participants, and 
none of the results substantively changed when they were included or excluded. Therefore, these 
participants were left in the sample for all data analyses.  
Procedure. The entire experiment was conducted on the Qualtrics survey platform, 
including recorded and written instructions, random assignment to conditions, presentation of 
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stimuli, and the collection of participants’ responses. Upon arrival, participants were greeted by 
an experimenter and led to an enclosed room where they could sit at a computer and complete 
the session in isolation (i.e., no one else was in the room during the session, including the 
experimenter). Participants were asked to turn off any cell phones or other devices they had with 
them, to use no other programs on the computer, and to pay exclusive attention to the experiment 
while they were present. The session began with an informational screen that described the aim 
of the study as “to deepen our understanding of how attentional processes and personality 
characteristics affect the way people react to the world around them,” but did not mention 
mindfulness or the specific hypotheses being tested. It further explained that as part of the study, 
they would be asked to provide their impressions of a variety of words and pictures.  
The computer program then randomly assigned the participant to one of the three 
experimental or control conditions (the between-subjects factor in this experiment). This method 
ensured a “double-blind” process in which neither the participant nor the experimenter knew 
who was assigned to what condition. Each participant was then asked to indicate their political 
ideological affiliation and level of associated ingroup identification. This included the following 
forced-choice question: “If you had to choose, to what extent would you say that you are 
conservative or liberal in your overall political views?” The response option for the question was 
a 6-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (extremely liberal) to 6 (extremely conservative) and 
no neutral or undecided option. Responses between 1 and 3 resulted in a participant ingroup 
assignment of “liberal,” while responses between 4 and 6 resulted in an assignment of 
“conservative.” This ingroup assignment was transparent to the participant and was used by the 
computer program for subsequent routing and stimuli presentation. Each participant then 
completed a 14-item ingroup identification scale. 
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Depending on the experimental assignment, participants were then presented with 
attentional instructions (i.e., mindful attention, immersed attention, or no instruction), which 
were both presented with on-screen text and through an embedded audio clip in which the on-
screen instructions were read aloud. For the immersion and mindfulness conditions, verbatim 
wording was used as from the Tincher et al. 2016 experiment (exact wording can be found in 
Appendix A). For example, the immersed-attention condition asked participants to “live the 
experience,” “travel in time to the event,” and “project yourself into it,” trying to experience it in 
vivid detail, where “it almost seems real to you.” The mindfulness condition, by contrast, asked 
participants to use an “observing perspective” in which they are reminded to consider their 
thoughts and reactions as “transitory, fleeting mental states” that arise and dissipate. They were 
not asked to avoid or suppress their thoughts, but to simply remain aware of them. The word 
“mindfulness” or its derivations were not used in the instructions. It is important to note that this 
was not an interactive exercise nor a guided meditation, but simply a set of instructions about 
how to pay attention. There were also no opportunities to ask clarifying questions. For the no-
instructions condition, participants were simply asked to view the pictures, and were told that we 
would be asking questions about them after they viewed them. Instructions for all three 
conditions were recorded by the same person (i.e., the author, who had no formal training in 
intervention delivery) and delivered in a similar intonation, style of speech, and–except for the 
no instruction condition–duration (the immersed-attention clip duration was one minute and 
forty-seven seconds; the mindful-attention clip duration was one minute and forty-nine seconds, 
and the no-instructions clip duration was twelve seconds). 
 Participants were asked to apply their attentional instructions to two politically-neutral 
practice photographs, which were presented for 10-seconds each. When participants were ready 
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to continue, a series of twelve political/social-themed practice photographs was presented, each 
picture showing for 10 seconds. 
After viewing the pictures, depending on their experimental group, participants were 
asked to complete manipulation-check questions (i.e., selected questions from the Toronto 
Mindfulness Scale, as well as several follow-up questions related to their attentional process and 
affective response, described in next section). They then received a brief reminder about the 
attentional instructions they were to practice, but they were now asked to apply them while 
reading a short paragraph. For example, in the immersion condition, they were instructed: “As 
you read [the paragraph], please remember to continue to completely immerse yourself in the 
text. That is, remember to try and live the experience by projecting yourself into it and 
experiencing it in vivid detail. You experience it almost as if it someone were actually speaking 
to you right now.” In the mindfulness condition, they were instructed, “As you read [the 
paragraph], please remember to continue to apply the ‘observing perspective.’ That is, remember 
to notice your thoughts and reactions to the words, trying not to avoid or suppress them. Just 
remain aware that they’re thoughts and reactions, and observe them as mental states that arise 
and dissipate.” The paragraph consisted of a hostile message, allegedly written by members of 
the political outgroup, and that disparaged the ingroup. After reading the paragraph, participants 
were once again asked the manipulation check questions. 
Participants were then provided with instructions related to eight LIB stimulus pictures 
(described in the next section). Prior to beginning, the participants were given a final brief 
reminder of the attentional instructions they were to apply while viewing the pictures. The LIB 
pictures indicated that the main protagonist was either a “liberal” or conservative.” The eight 
pictures were presented in two randomized blocks of four pictures (i.e., either the four liberal-
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target pictures or the four conservative-target pictures were presented first), and within each 
block, the four pictures were randomized. Each picture appeared for 10 seconds, after which four 
descriptions appeared beneath the cartoon, and participants were asked to “select the description 
that best represents what is occurring in that scene.”  
After viewing and rating the LIB stimuli, participants were presented with a randomly-
ordered list of the 20 infrahumanization emotion words. They were asked to select the words that 
they felt are typical characteristics of liberals/conservatives (they repeated this exercise twice, 
once for each target group, and the order was randomized). After this task was completed, 
participants completed a dispositional mindfulness questionnaire, and they were asked to indicate 
their level of experience with meditation before they were debriefed. 
Stimuli and measures. 
Attentional practice and ingroup threat stimuli. A series of photographs selected from 
the internet was used to provide a focus for attentional practice during the experiment. First, two 
non-political photographs were presented: an image of one person helping another person who 
had fallen in the snow, and a close-up image of a tarantula spider. The two photographs were 
used to provide an orientation and practice to the task of visually attending to pictures, and their 
non-political nature helped to mask the overall purpose of this part of the experiment. After this 
presentation, twelve photographs were presented that depicted scenes of contemporary political 
or social issues/events, such as images of the Black Lives Matter, Occupy Wall Street, and 
Women’s March protests, the inaugurations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, a group-
picture of members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a Palestinian activist throwing a 
stone, and a Mexican immigrants’ rights activist confronting a counter-protester. These scenes 
were selected based solely on my subjective impression of their emotional content and relevance 
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to current events, and their purpose in the experiment was twofold: to evoke an emotional 
response of some kind (irrespective of valence or cognitive content) and to provide a focus of 
attention. The assumption was that by visually focusing on evocative political and social 
pictures, participants’ own political views and group membership would be made salient.  
 In addition, I asked participants to read a paragraph ostensibly written by a member of 
their political outgroup, which disparaged the ingroup by employing several insulting 
stereotypes. Like the preceding pictures, this stimulus was presented to provide another focus for 
attentional instructions. However, this stimulus was also intended to produce a sense of ingroup 
threat, since prior research has suggested that such a threat can increase the LIB effect (Maass et 
al., 1996). Two versions of the paragraph were created (one focused on liberals and one on 
conservatives), and they were balanced for number and structure of words/sentences, wording 
complexity, and topical content. The full text of the paragraphs can be found in Appendix B. 
Linguistic Intergroup Bias. To measure the LIB effect, I included a set of stimuli that 
has been used in previous research (e.g., Douglas & Sutton, 2003; Franco & Maass, 1996; 
Tincher et al., 2016). These stimuli consist of single-frame cartoon pictures that illustrate a 
protagonist–clearly labeled in the picture with the letter A–engaging in a specific behavior. The 
depicted behaviors are designed to be easily recognized as positive or negative in terms of 
valence, and sometimes show the protagonist interacting with another person or acting alone. 
Examples of positive behaviors include picking up trash at park, helping an elderly woman 
across the street, and helping an injured basketball player off the ground. Examples of negative 
behaviors include littering, spray-painting on a wall, and hitting another person. 
Each picture was accompanied by a set of four response options (multiple choice), and 
the participant was asked to choose the description that most accurately represents the action 
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being portrayed in the picture. The four available description choices, in turn, represented 
increasing levels of linguistic abstraction, and they were always presented with the most concrete 
description listed first and the most abstract listed last. 
I used the same set of eight stimulus pictures used by Tincher et al. (2016) (see Appendix 
C). The pictures were balanced for valence, where half depicted positive behaviors and half 
depicted negative behaviors. However, in this experiment I made one modification to the stimuli: 
as each picture was presented to the participant, a text label above the picture read either “Person 
A is a liberal” or “Person A is a conservative.” To minimize confounding between this 
conservative/liberal attribute and any other specific attribute of a given picture, I created two 
versions of the eight LIB stimulus pictures. Version A paired the “conservative” label with two 
specific positive and two specific negative behaviors and paired the “liberal” label with the 
remaining two positive and two negative behaviors. Version B reversed this pairing, such that the 
“conservative” label was paired with the behaviors that were paired with “liberal” in Version A, 
and vice-versa for the “conservative” label. Each participant was then randomly assigned to be 
presented one of the two LIB stimuli versions. 
To calculate the dependent measure of language abstraction, the average of each 
participant’s two ratings within valence and target group was calculated to produce a set of four 
average language abstraction scores for each participant: positive ingroup behavior, negative 
ingroup behavior, positive outgroup behavior, and negative outgroup behavior. These four scores 
comprised the two within-subjects factors of target group membership and behavior valence. 
Infrahumanization. The experiment included procedures and stimuli that have been used 
in prior research to measure infrahumanization (e.g., Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002, p. 
108, Table 1). Participants were presented with a randomized list of 20 different emotions that 
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were balanced for positive/negative valence and primary/secondary emotional categorization (the 
full list can be seen in Table 3). Participants were presented with the same list of words twice. 
On the first trial, they were asked to select from the list all the words that they consider to be 
typical characteristics for either liberals or conservatives. The second trial repeated the 
instruction, but the target group was switched. The target group presentation order was 
randomized. The two additional within-subjects factors of emotion valence and emotion type 
were formed by creating four sub-scores for each trial: the number of positive primary emotions 
selected, the number positive secondary emotions selected, the number of negative primary 
emotions selected, and the number of negative secondary emotions selected. 
Manipulation checks. As a means of ensuring that the mindfulness instructions had the 
intended effect, I used four items from the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (Lau et al., 2006). The 
Toronto Mindfulness Scale is a 13-item Likert-type rating scale that assesses retrospective 
curiosity and decentering towards one’s experience. As such, it is a self-report measure of state 
mindfulness. Response options range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Two representative 
items from the Curiosity subscale were selected to use for this experiment: “I was curious about 
my reactions to things” and “I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings that I was 
having” (α = .83). Two representative items from the Decentering subscale were also selected: “I 
was more concerned with being open to my experiences than controlling or changing them” and 
“I experienced my thoughts more as events in my mind than as a necessarily accurate reflection 
of the way things ‘really’ are” (α = .51, indicating that these two items were not necessarily 
capturing the same dimension of decentering). In addition, all conditions included several 
questions related to the extent to which the participant could follow the instructions, how 
difficult it was for them to do so, and various aspects of how they felt while experiencing the 
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stimuli. These questions, along with their descriptive statistics, are listed in Table 2. Each 
manipulation check item was analyzed separately (i.e., no additive subscales were created). 
Covariates. Several covariates were included in the experiment to simultaneously allow 
for the reduction of error variance (by including them as only main effects in the statistical 
model) and to test the potential of theoretically interesting moderators (by also including their 
interactions with the independent variables). The only a priori directional hypotheses connected 
to these covariates were general predictions that higher ingroup identification and social 
dominance orientation would be associated with higher intergroup bias and that trait mindfulness 
would be associated with lower intergroup bias. 
Ingroup identification. I included a 14-item Likert-type scale measure of ingroup 
identification developed by Leach et al. (2008). The scale measures two primary dimensions of 
ingroup identification (self-investment and self-definition), which are further broken down into 
five components: solidarity, satisfaction, centrality, individual self-stereotyping, and ingroup 
homogeneity. All items include response options ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) and include statements such as “I am glad to be a/an [ingroup]; The fact that I 
am a/an [ingroup] is an important part of my identity; I am similar to the average [ingroup] 
person;” and so forth. A useful feature of the scale is that it is designed to be adapted to any 
intergroup context. In this experiment, the “[ingroup]” component of each question was 
programmatically replaced to match whichever political ideology group the participant reported 
being most strongly identifying with. This measure was included for two reasons. First, it 
represented a convenient way to make the participants’ political identification salient within the 
context of the experiment. Second, since degree of ingroup identification is known to moderate 
intergroup bias and infrahumanization, it was important to investigate any moderating influences 
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on the variables in this experiment (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Maass, 1999). For the analyses 
in this report, a composite ingroup identification score was calculated by taking the average 
response to all 14 items. Cronbach’s α for all 14 items was .90. 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Social Dominance Orientation is a measure of an 
individual's preference for hierarchy within a social system, as well as domination over lower-
status groups. It is correlated positively with political conservatism and negatively with empathy 
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). SDO has also been identified as “the most 
replicated ideological correlate of dehumanization” (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014, p. 410). It is 
therefore a useful measure to include in the present study as a covariate, since by doing so it is 
possible to not only control for independent effects of SDO on intergroup bias, but also to test for 
potential moderation effects. A mass-testing prescreening questionnaire (completed several 
months prior to the experiment) included four items corresponding to the short-form version of 
the Social Dominance Orientation scale (Pratto et al., 2014). The average response to the four 
items was used to calculate a composite index of SDO. Cronbach’s α for the four items was .77. 
Trait-Mindfulness and Experience with Meditation. Dispositional or trait mindfulness 
has been shown to moderate the effects of brief mindfulness interventions, at least on 
physiological measures (e.g., Laurent, Laurent, Nelson, Wright, & De, 2015). As such, it is a 
useful covariate to consider in the present study. I included the Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire–Short Form (FFMQ-SF, Bohlmeijer, Klooster, Fledderus, Veehof, & Baer, 2011). 
This scale is a 24-item Likert-type self-report rating of various skills associated with 
mindfulness. It represents a shortened version of the scale developed by Baer et al. (2006). For 
analyses in this report, I calculated a composite score by taking the average response to all 24 
items. Cronbach’s α for all 24 items was .79. Additionally, at the end of the experiment, 
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participants were asked to indicate whether, and to what extent, they have had any experience 
with meditation. 
Results 
 Descriptives and distributional assumptions. In general, language abstraction ratings 
were on the low end of the scale, with a distribution that had some positive skew and a very high 
peak, (M = 1.75, Mdn = 1.5, SD = 0.66 on a scale from 1 to 4). The distribution for the count of 
emotions selected in each infrahumanization trial was also somewhat positively skewed, with a 
peak near 5 but also a peak at the maximum range, as several participants selected all 20 
available emotions (M = 6.16, Mdn = 5.0, SD = 2.52). To examine assumptions regarding 
homogeneity of variance, I compared the variance of both dependent measures across 
experimental groups and across participant political ingroup membership. Differences in 
variance were well within reasonable ranges. 
 Of the three continuous-measure covariates, the ingroup identification composite measure 
had a negative significant correlation with SDO, r = -.23, p < .001, though this is likely 
explained by the disproportionate number of liberals in the sample. Separate regressions revealed 
that being more highly-identified with liberal political ideology was associated with lower SDO 
(b = -0.305, p < .001) whereas being more highly identified with conservative ideology was 
associated with higher SDO (b = 0.190, p = .122). Trait mindfulness was not significantly 
correlated with either ingroup identification or SDO. Table 1 lists the means, standard deviations, 
and other descriptive information about the covariate measures. Note that slightly more than a 
third of the sample reported having some prior meditation experience (whether mindfulness 
meditation or some other type), which is relatively high compared to recent estimates of the 
general U.S population (Clarke, Black, Stussman, Barnes, & Nahin, 2015). This proportion did 
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not differ substantially between liberal and conservative participants (33.9% vs. 35.8%, 
respectively), χ2(1) = 0.013, p = .91. Interestingly, reported prior meditation experience was not 
related to statistically significant differences in trait mindfulness, with means of 3.31 (SD = 0.37) 
for those with prior meditation experience and 3.24 (SD = 0.37) for those with no prior 
meditation experience, t(1, 204) = 1.32, p = .19. 
 To examine differences in degree of political ingroup identification between liberal and 
conservative participants, I used two comparisons. First, I calculated the average difference from 
the mid-point of 3.5 that conservative and liberal participants rated themselves on the six-point 
political identification question. On average, conservative participants were 0.95 points away 
from the mid-point of the scale (in the conservative direction), whereas liberal participants were 
1.30 points away from the mid-point of the scale (in the liberal direction). In other words, liberal 
participants in the sample reported being more highly liberal on average than conservatives 
reported being highly conservative, t(1, 205) = -3.89, p < .001. However, the difference in 
overall political ingroup identification—using the 14-item measure—between liberal and 
conservative participants, although having the same direction, did not reach the significance 
threshold. The mean for liberal participants on this measure was 4.75, whereas the mean for 
conservative participants was 4.50, t(1, 205) = -1.95, p = .053. 
Manipulation checks. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the 12 manipulation-
check items that participants responded to. Note that some items, such as items 1 through 4 from 
the Toronto Mindfulness Scale, were not asked of all participants, but only those in relevant 
experimental conditions (see Table 2 caption for further detail). For the most part, means were in 
the expected direction. For example, participants indicated that they had, on average, moderate-
to-high levels of affect and interest in response to the political pictures and disparaging 
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paragraph (items 6 and 11), and they reported relatively high levels of being able to continuously 
follow the attentional instructions and that it was relatively easy to do so (items 7 and 8). 
Importantly, there was some evidence to suggest that the attempt to elicit mindfulness in 
this experiment was not as successful as one might hope. For example, items from the Toronto 
Mindfulness Scale (items 1 through 4 in Table 2), such as the statements “I was more concerned 
with being open to my experiences than controlling or changing them” and “I experienced my 
thoughts more as events in my mind than as a necessarily accurate reflection of the way things 
‘really’ are” were presented to participants in the mindfulness condition after they viewed the 
political pictures and ingroup-threat paragraph. Responses to these questions showed only 
modest levels of agreement and had relatively normal and centered distributions, suggesting that 
at least a subset of the participants in the mindfulness condition were not experiencing curiosity 
or decentering regarding the stimuli. This was especially evident after reading the ingroup-
threatening message, in which an outgroup member verbally disparages the ingroup. 
Interestingly, a number of participants in the mindfulness condition did not agree, or only agreed 
“a little” with the statement that their thoughts were not an “accurate reflection of the way things 
‘really’ are,” which suggests that many participants were identified with their beliefs about the 
outgroup; that is, they found the stereotyped messages coming from the outgroup member as 
plausible and reflective of reality. 
Linguistic intergroup bias. An a priori Type I error rate of 0.05 was used for all 
inferential analyses in these experiments. To analyze responses to the LIB stimuli, I conducted a 
2 (stimulus target’s group membership: ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (stimulus target’s behavior 
valence: positive vs. negative) × 3 (attentional instructions: no instructions, immersion, or 
mindfulness) mixed factorial ANOVA; the first two variables were within-subjects.3 The 
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hypothesis of interest consisted of the three-way interaction among these factors. However, the 
omnibus interaction effect was non-significant, F(2, 204) < 1, p = .865, ηG2 = .0003, ηP2 = .0001. 
Figure 1 depicts the estimated means for this interaction (error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals). Importantly, the two-way interaction between the target group membership and 
behavior valence was also non-significant, F(1, 204) = 2.38, p = .125, ηG2 = .002, ηP2 = .011, 
suggesting that the LIB effect did not occur, even in the two control conditions. To confirm that 
mindfulness condition had no effect, the analysis was repeated both by combining the two 
control conditions and comparing them to the mindfulness condition, as well as by only 
including the two control conditions. In none of these analyses did the expected target group × 
valence interaction appear. 
The only statistically significant effect in the model was the main effect of stimulus 
valence, F(1, 204) = 9.57, p = .002, ηG2 = .008, ηP2 = .045. Negative behaviors received more 
abstract language ratings than positive behaviors, with means and 95% confidence intervals 
respectively of 1.80 [1.73, 1.88] versus 1.69 [1.61, 1.76]. However, this result is not particularly 
relevant to the research hypotheses. 
As a follow-up analysis, I reran the same repeated measures ANOVA several times, each 
time including one of the covariates—prior meditation experience, trait mindfulness, SDO, and 
ingroup identification score—testing both main effects and their interactions with other factors. 
Neither controlling for these covariates nor including their interactions with other factors 
revealed any further statistically significant effects for linguistic abstraction scores. In other 
words, there were no significant main or interaction effects involving any of the covariates, nor 
did controlling for them change the outcome of the previous analyses. 
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As a further way of assessing whether the LIB effect was elicited in any condition, I 
created a single metric of the LIB effect by taking the average of two subscores: the language 
abstraction score for ingroup positive behaviors subtracted by that of ingroup negative behaviors, 
and the language abstraction score for outgroup negative behaviors subtracted by outgroup 
positive behaviors. This resulted in a zero-centered score that had positive values if the LIB 
effect was elicited toward either the ingroup, outgroup, or both. The overall mean of this new 
measure was 0.06 (SD = 0.55), and the maximum mean difference between experimental 
conditions was 0.05. Thus, the LIB effect was virtually non-existent in this experiment.  
Infrahumanization. To analyze responses to the infrahumanization stimuli, I conducted 
a 2 (target’s group membership: ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (emotion type: primary vs. secondary) 
× 2 (emotion valence: positive vs. negative) × 3 (attentional instructions: no instructions, 
immersion, or mindfulness) mixed factorial ANOVA; the first three variables were within-
subjects. The hypothesis of interest consisted of the three-way interaction among target group, 
emotion type, and attentional instructions. The omnibus interaction effect was non-significant, 
F(2, 204) < 1, p = .789, ηG2 = .0001, ηP2 = .002 (shown in Figure 2). There was, however, a 
relatively large two-way significant interaction between target group and emotion type, F(1, 204) 
= 84.16, p < .001, ηG2 = .023, ηP2 = .292, and an inspection of the means revealed a consistent 
pattern of infrahumanization across experimental conditions (this can be seen in Figure 2). 
Participants consistently rated the outgroup as having fewer secondary emotions than the ingroup 
(means of 2.39 vs. 3.64, respectively), whereas they rated the outgroup as having more primary 
emotions than the ingroup (means of 3.43 vs. 2.87, respectively). Simple effects tests showed 
that the effect of target group was significant within only secondary emotions, F(1, 204) = 87.67, 
p < .001, ηG2 = .062, ηP2 = .300, as well as within only primary emotions, F(1, 204) = 22.80, p < 
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.001, ηG2 = .012, ηP2 = .100. The main effect of target group was also significant, F(1, 204) = 
19.66, p < .001, ηG2 = .003, ηP2 = .090. On average, participants attributed a greater number of 
emotions to the ingroup than the outgroup (means of 6.51 vs. 5.82, respectively).  
There were also three significant effects associated with the valence of the emotions. The 
main effect of valence was significant, F(1, 204) = 38.69, p < .001, ηG2 = .016, ηP2 = .159. 
Across other factors, participants tended to select more positive than negative emotions. 
However, two interactions qualified this effect. First, there was significant two-way interaction 
between emotion valence and target group, F(1, 204) = 121.46, p < .001, ηG2 = .068, ηP2 = .373. 
That is, participants attributed more positive emotions to their ingroup (M = 4.42 for ingroup and 
2.48 for outgroup) and more negative emotions to the outgroup (M = 2.09 for ingroup and 3.33 
for outgroup), independent of whether those emotions were primary or secondary in nature. 
Second, there was a significant two-way interaction between emotion valence and emotion type, 
F(1, 204) = 42.28, p < .001, ηG2 = .010, ηP2 = .172. Independent of target group, participants 
tended to select more negative primary emotions (M = 3.07) than negative secondary emotions 
(M = 2.35), and they tended to select fewer positive primary emotions (M = 3.23) than positive 
secondary emotions (M = 3.67). No other main effects or interactions in the model were reliable, 
ps > .08. 
As a follow-up exploratory analysis, the participant’s political ingroup (liberal, 
conservative) was added to the model. While there were still no effects associated with the 
experimental manipulation, the participant’s ingroup was found to moderate the 
infrahumanization effect described above. That is, the three-way interaction between the 
participant’s political ingroup, the target group, and the type of emotion was significant, F(1, 
201) = 32.66, p < .001, ηG2 = .008, ηP2 = .140. Inspection of the means for each group revealed 
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that although conservative participants had virtually no differences in the average number of 
emotions they selected across the target group and emotion type, liberal participants’ distribution 
of emotions showed a reliable pattern of attributing more primary emotions and fewer secondary 
to the outgroup (conservatives) relative to the ingroup (liberals). This finding seems to suggest 
that the infrahumanization effect was limited to liberals’ ratings of conservatives and not vice 
versa.  
However, this three-way interaction was further qualified by a significant four-way 
interaction that included emotional valence. In other words, the interaction between the 
participant’s political ingroup, emotion valence, emotion type, and target group was significant, 
though the effect size was relatively small, F(1, 201) = 4.28, p = .04, ηG2 = .001, ηP2 = .021. This 
interaction is best conveyed visually (see Figure 3). Figure 3 shows the average number of 
selected emotions by emotion type and participant ingroup, but the top chart includes only 
positive emotions whereas the bottom chart includes only negative ones. For positive emotions, 
conservative participants on average attributed fewer secondary emotions to the outgroup, but 
the effect was much smaller than for liberal participants.  
To decompose this four-way interaction, a series of four simple effects tests were 
performed to examine how the two-way interaction between target group and emotion type 
varied as a function of emotion valence and the participant’s ingroup. For conservative 
participants only, the two-way interaction between target group and emotion type was not 
significant for either positive emotions, F(1, 55) < 1, p = .71, ηG2 = .0002, ηP2 = .003, or for 
negative emotions, F(1, 55) < 1, p = .50, ηG2 = .0009, ηP2 = .008. In other words, while the 
pattern of means among conservatives was consistent with an infrahumanization effect (see 
Figure 3), the differences were not large enough to be considered statistically significant. 
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However, for liberal participants only, the two-way interaction between target group and emotion 
type was significant for both positive emotions, F(1, 150) = 103.9, p < .001, ηG2 = .060, ηP2 = 
.409 and for negative emotions, F(1, 150) = 45.2, p < .001, ηG2 = .028, ηP2 = .231. Additional 
simple effects tests revealed that for liberal participants, the difference in how they attributed 
primary and secondary emotions to the ingroup versus outgroup was significant in all cases 
except for negative secondary emotions. For example, for positive secondary emotions, liberals 
attributed significantly fewer emotions to the outgroup (M = 0.83) than the ingroup (M = 2.70), 
F(1, 150) = 207.15, p < .001, ηG2 = .031, ηP2 = .580 (and note that this effect size was over six 
times larger than among conservative participants, who had an effect size of ηP2 = .093 for the 
same comparison; see the second and fourth set of columns in the top panel of Figure 3). 
Additionally, liberal participants attributed fewer positive primary emotions to conservatives, 
though the effect size was small, F(1, 150) = 13.8, p < .001, ηG2 = .016, ηP2 = .080, and they 
attributed more negative primary emotions to conservatives F(1, 150) = 86.8, p < .001, ηG2 = 
.133, ηP2 = .367. 
To simplify further exploratory covariate analyses, I reduced the number of factors 
involved by converting the dependent measure into a single metric of infrahumanization. 
Informed by the previous results, I did this by subtracting the number of positive secondary 
emotions attributed to the outgroup from the number attributed to the ingroup. This created a 
zero-centered score in which positive values indicated infrahumanization. This new index acted 
as the dependent measure in a series of models that tested for the effects of ingroup 
identification, SDO, meditation experience, and trait mindfulness. Of these analyses, the only 
additional statistically significant result relevant to the experimental design was a positive 
relationship between ingroup identification and infrahumanization, F(1, 195) = 27.15, p < .001, 
MINDFULNESS AND POLITICAL INTERGROUP BIAS 38 
ηG2 = .122, ηP2 = .122, b = 0.768. In other words, after controlling for the main effects and 
interactions among experimental condition and the participant’s ingroup, the main effect of 
ingroup identification explained slightly more than 12% of the variance in the infrahumanization 
effect. Participants’ political ingroup did not moderate this effect (i.e., the relationship was 
positive for both liberal and conservative participants).  
Importantly, these models also revealed that the effect of the participant’s political 
ingroup on infrahumanization was still significant after controlling for each of the different 
covariates (i.e., meditation experience, trait mindfulness, SDO, and ingroup identification). For 
example, the difference between liberals’ and conservatives’ level of infrahumanization of the 
outgroup was still significant after controlling for two different measures of political ingroup 
identification: the participants’ degree of difference from the mid-point score of the political 
identification question, F(1, 200) = 17.61, p < .001, ηG2 = .080, ηP2 = .080, and the 14-item 
composite measure of political ingroup identification, F(1, 195) = 23.57, p < .001, ηG2 = .096, 
ηP2 = .108. This is important because it addresses some alternative explanations for the 
liberal/conservative differences in infrahumanization in this sample, such as the fact that liberal 
participants had, on average, higher levels of political identification than conservative 
participants. 
In terms of the specific emotions that participants selected to characterize their ingroup 
and outgroup, some notable patterns emerged. Frequencies and percentages are listed in Table 3, 
which shows the complete list of 20 emotions, once for conservative participants’ ratings and 
once for liberal participants.’ Both lists are sorted by the highest-frequency emotions attributed 
to the outgroup. Secondary emotions are listed in bold font and positive emotions are designated 
with asterisks. Note that the words “rage” and fear”—both negative primary emotions—were 
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commonly used by both groups to describe their respective outgroup. However, conservative 
participants also chose the words “love” and “friendliness”—both positive secondary emotions—
with a relatively high frequency to describe liberals, and conservatives generally used a greater 
mix of primary and secondary emotions to describe liberals, whereas liberals’ highest-frequency 
choices were almost exclusively primary negative emotions. Liberals chose the words “cruelty” 
and “terror” to describe conservatives, whereas these words appear near the bottom of the list for 
conservatives’ ratings of liberals. 
Discussion 
 The major hypotheses in this experiment—that mindful attention would reduce or 
eliminate linguistic intergroup bias and infrahumanization in a context emphasizing opposing 
political group membership—were not supported. Moreover, the LIB effect could not be reliably 
elicited in any condition, even in an active control condition characterized by repeated 
instructions to completely immerse oneself in the stimuli. The infrahumanization results were 
more nuanced, in that infrahumanization was observed across all conditions, but not exactly in 
the manner predicted by prior theory; ingroup members did not attribute fewer secondary 
emotions to outgroups irrespective of emotional valence. Instead, the effect was generally 
associated with only positive secondary emotions, and this coexisted with another clear pattern: 
positive emotions in general were differentially attributed more to the ingroup and negative 
emotions were differentially attributed more to the outgroup, arguably a form of intergroup bias 
it itself.  
This raises the question of whether the pattern of results genuinely reflects the 
phenomenon of “infrahumanization” or rather reflects a more generalized ingroup-favoritism or 
bias effect. Indeed, this seems to be a point of some contention in the prior literature. For 
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example, Leyens et al., in their 2007 review, state that the hypothesis that people will associate 
both positive and negative uniquely-human emotions to the ingroup more than the outgroup is 
precisely what distinguishes infrahumanization from something like ingroup-favoritism (p. 146). 
However, several years earlier, Leyens et al. (2003) briefly discussed how the valence of the 
stimuli often had unanticipated effects in their experiments, particularly in contexts associated 
with intergroup conflict and antagonism. They observe that “[during later experiments with 
antagonistic groups], whereas almost all the negative primary emotions were attributed to the 
outgroup and barely none to the ingroup, the difference was less pronounced for negative 
secondary emotions” (p. 709). While the authors do not specify exactly what this means, it seems 
consistent with the idea that at least in some contexts, the negative valence of the stimuli might 
be more salient than the fact that they denote uniquely-human emotions. Thus, even negative 
secondary emotions might be differentially attributed more to the outgroup. These two 
statements by Leyens and colleagues seem at odds, however, and I am unaware of any resolution 
in the literature that adequately clarifies the theoretical relationships among primary/secondary 
emotions, emotional valence, and infrahumanization of outgroups in specific contexts. 
Notwithstanding this theoretical murkiness, it still seems apparent that participants were 
responding to the intergroup context, and that there was at least some degree of psychological 
realism and ingroup-defensiveness present in the experiment. This is supported by the fact that a 
clear relationship could be seen between level of ingroup identification and what I shall continue 
to call infrahumanization. This is further attested to by responses to the manipulation-check 
items that assessed affect and interest in response to the political pictures and disparaging 
paragraph.  
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Given this, what are we to make of the null findings with respect to the LIB effect 
broadly, and to the mindfulness manipulation in particular? There are many possible 
explanations other than that the null hypothesis is true. Methodologically, this experiment had 
many similarities to Tincher et al. (2016), but was also different in key respects. It has become 
increasingly evident to social psychologists that even minor differences in method can lead to 
different results, and it is possible that I inadvertently introduced a moderator or nuisance 
variable into the design. On the other hand, even aspects of the design that I copied exactly from 
Tincher et al. (2016), such as the experimental instructions and the sentences and drawings used 
to measure potential LIB, could have weaknesses or unreliable effects. Several aspects of the 
method seem especially relevant:  
1. Whereas most LIB research, including Tincher et al. (2016), expose participants to the 
LIB stimuli suddenly and without prior visual processing tasks, I asked participants to pay close 
attention to other visual stimuli prior to LIB stimulus exposure, which may have encouraged all 
participants to be more concrete in their visual judgments generally. For example, whereas 
Tincher et al. (2016) observed mean language abstraction scores of 2.0 or above in three of their 
experimental conditions, mean scores in this experiment never exceeded 2.0.  
2. Unlike Tincher et al. (2016), I included within-subjects factors as part of the design, 
which meant that participants’ ratings of their ingroup were compared to their own outgroup 
ratings (c.f., Maass et al., 1996). This raises the possibility that the LIB effect may have been 
present in the initial block of trials, but then disappeared in the participants’ second block, as 
they got used to doing the task. Unfortunately, I failed to adequately record which block was 
randomly presented first for each participant, so I was unable to test this hypothesis.  
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3. The ingroup identification scale was always presented at the beginning of the 
experiment and was always followed by politically-themed pictures and a derogatory political 
paragraph. This could have potentially influenced participants’ behavior or offered some hints 
about the intent of the study. 
4. Most LIB research, including Tincher et al. (2016), presents the LIB response options 
always in the same order, from the most concrete description first to the most abstract description 
last. This introduces the risk of primacy/recency effects in participants’ responses (e.g., visual-
mode surveys have been associated with primacy effects, Groves et al., 2011, pp. 157, 239). 
5. Even though there was at least some evidence of psychological realism, it is possible 
that the stimuli were not realistic enough. For example, the LIB stimuli consisted of crudely-
drawn cartoon pictures, which have the advantage of being ambiguous regarding demographic 
characteristics but also have the disadvantage of not depicting actual human beings engaged in 
actual behavior. In addition, the ingroup threat stimuli arguably did not present a convincing 
cover story about who wrote the paragraphs and under what circumstances. These aspects of 
artificiality could have reduced the salience and meaning of the intergroup context. 
6. Finally, the attentional instructions used for the experimental manipulation consisted 
of brief text and recorded narration that lasted just under two minutes. It is important to note that 
these instructions, although repeated three times during the experiment, did not contain 
interactive components, such as a guided meditation. Arguably, presenting intellectually-focused 
instructions about what constitutes an “observing perspective” is a rather low-dose mindfulness 
manipulation. This argument is supported by the relatively moderate responses that were 
provided to the Toronto Mindfulness Scale items immediately after viewing the stimuli. A 
stronger mindfulness manipulation might have led the participant through an interactive 
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mindfulness exercise, during which they could experience their present-moment thoughts, 
feelings, and perceptions and notice their transient quality.  
Experiment 2 
 Given the six potential design weaknesses identified above, I sought to carry out another 
experiment that followed the same overall paradigm but included several design modifications. 
Thus, Experiment 2 had the same goals in mind as Experiment 1 and had an identical factorial 
design (i.e., same independent and dependent variables, factorial structure, and basic procedure). 
However, several aspects of the design were modified (described in the next section).  
Method 
Sample and participant selection. Two hundred and sixty-five students, recruited from 
an undergraduate participant pool at a large public northeastern university in the United States,  
participated in the study in exchange for partial course credit. Recruitment procedures were 
identical to Experiment 1, with the exception that a slightly wider range of political non-
affiliation was excluded from eligibility.4 Recruitment and data collection took place during the 
month of October, 2017. 
No participants were excluded from data analysis, so the final sample consisted of 265 
participants (68.3% female; Mage = 18.4 years, SDage = 1.2 years, age range: 17-25 years). Of the 
265 participants, 92 (34.7%) self-identified as conservative and 173 (65.3.0%) self-identified as 
liberal. Random assignment to experimental conditions yielded the following slightly 
imbalanced design: n = 88 in the no instruction condition; n = 89 in the immersion condition; and 
n = 88 in the mindfulness condition. 
Twenty-five participants (9.4%) failed at least one attention check that had been included 
in the experiment. As in Experiment 1, all analyses were conducted by both including and 
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excluding these 25 participants, and none of the results substantively changed when they were 
included or excluded. Therefore, these participants were left in the sample for all data analyses.  
Procedure and measures. All aspects of the procedure and the measures were identical 
to Experiment 1 except for seven design modifications, which are reviewed below. Cronbach’s 
alphas for the SDO, ingroup identification, and FFMQ scales were .76, .91, and .80, respectively. 
1. The modality and topical content of attentional practice stimuli was changed from 
visual to auditory and from political in nature to apolitical. Instead of the political/social pictures 
in Experiment 1, I used a two-minute, fifteen-second audio excerpt from episode 476, Act Two, 
of the public radio program “This American Life.” The excerpt consisted of a narrative, first-
person account of a shark attack. This design change was implemented both to preclude the 
possibility of visually affecting the implicit cognitive processes usually evoked when LIB visual 
stimuli are suddenly presented, as well as to provide an emotionally evocative stimulus that 
would help mask the political theme of the experiment. 
2. The cartoon LIB stimulus pictures were replaced with real-world counterparts taken 
from the internet. In addition, two of the stimulus behaviors that were associated with 
excessively-skewed responses in Experiment 1 (e.g., a person running, which was almost 
exclusively answered using the most concrete description across all conditions) were replaced 
with other behaviors that were of the same valence. That is, the behavior of telling a sexist joke 
was replaced with cheating on a test, and the behavior of running was replaced with someone 
studying. The pictures and their response options appear in Appendix D. 
3. The LIB stimulus response options were randomized for every picture.  
4. Variables were added to allow the recording of which LIB trial block (ingroup vs. 
outgroup) was randomly presented first to each participant. 
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 5. A more realistic context for the ingroup-threatening message was developed. While the 
text of the actual paragraph stayed the same, participants were informed that “the statement was 
recently recorded during a private, closed-door fundraiser for a [liberal/conservative, depending 
on their outgroup] congressional caucus. The comments were part of a caucus member’s speech 
to potential donors.” 
6. The ingroup identification scale was randomly presented either at the beginning or end 
of the experiment. This helped balance the need to make political belonging salient, but at the 
same time, to minimize the potential for providing cues about the intent of the experiment. 
7. For the mindfulness condition only, I added an auditory-guided meditation exercise in 
addition to attentional instructions. The guided meditation was presented immediately after the 
shark-attack audio clip, and it consisted of a short (approximately one minute) audio recording of 
the experimenter, who read matching on-screen text. The meditation asked the participant to 
close their eyes and observe any thoughts or other reactions they had to listening to the audio 
clip. It also asked them to scan their body and notice sensations, notice sounds, feelings, and so 
forth, and to also notice how those experiences arise and fade away and are constantly changing. 
All attention instructions, including those used for the auditory guided meditation, are included 
verbatim in Appendix E. 
Results 
Descriptives and distributional assumptions. The distributions for language abstraction and 
emotion-count scores were very similar to those in Experiment 1. Both measures were clustered 
toward the low end and had some positive skew and peaked distributions (M = 1.87, Mdn = 1.5, 
SD = 0.66 for language abstraction; M = 5.2, Mdn = 5.0, SD = 2.1 for emotion frequency). 
Assumptions for homogeneity of variance were assessed in the same manner as in Experiment 1 
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and no substantial differences among groups were detected. As in Experiment 1, ingroup 
identification had an overall negative significant correlation with SDO, r = -.19, p = 002, but 
interacted with political ideology in that conservatives showed a positive correlation (b = 0.144, 
p = .094) whereas liberals showed a negative one (b = -0.415, p < .001). Trait mindfulness was 
not significantly correlated with either ingroup identification or SDO. Table 4 lists the means, 
standard deviations, and other descriptive information about the covariate measures. The 
percentage of participants who reported having some prior meditation was similar to that 
observed in Experiment 1. Reported meditation experience did not significantly differ between 
liberal and conservative participants (35.9% vs. 36.4%, respectively), χ2(1) = 0.00, p = 1.0. 
Additionally, reported prior meditation experience was associated with significantly higher trait 
mindfulness scores, with means of 3.33 (SD = 0.41) for those with prior meditation experience 
and 3.21 (SD = 0.39) for those with no prior meditation experience, t(1, 263) = 2.41, p = .017. 
(Note that these means are almost identical to those observed in Experiment 1, but the larger 
sample size in Experiment 2 resulted in a higher power to detect a statistically reliable 
difference.) 
I used the same two comparisons as in Experiment 1 to examine differences in degree of 
political ingroup identification between liberal and conservative participants. For example, for 
the single-item question of political identification, conservative participants had an average score 
that was 1.15 points away from the mid-point of the scale (in the conservative direction), 
whereas liberal participants were 1.38 points away from the mid-point of the scale (in the liberal 
direction). In other words, although the difference was smaller than it was in Experiment 1, 
liberal participants in Experiment 2 reported being more highly liberal on average than 
conservatives reported being highly conservative, t(1, 263) = -3.25, p = .001. In addition, liberal 
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participants had a higher average overall political ingroup identification than conservatives, with 
mean scores of 4.86 and 4.47, respectively, t(1, 263) = -3.51, p < .001. 
Manipulation checks. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the 12 manipulation-
check items, which were identical to Experiment 1 in wording and placement, except that the 
word “pictures” was changed to “audio clip” in items 5 and 6. As in Experiment 1, means were 
in the expected direction. For example, participants indicated that they had, on average, 
moderate-to-high levels of affect and interest in response to the audio clip and disparaging 
paragraph (items 6 and 11), and they reported relatively high levels of being able to continuously 
follow the attentional instructions and that it was relatively easy to do so (items 7 and 8). 
Although the means and distributions for the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (items 1 through 
4 in Table 5) still suggested relatively modest levels of curiosity and decentering regarding the 
stimuli, it is notable that means, medians, and ranges were higher relative to Experiment 1. This 
suggests that the mindfulness manipulation was indeed stronger than in Experiment 1, but still 
not ideal. For example, the median score of 3 represents a response of moderately, and standard 
deviations close to 1.0 indicate that a relatively common response to these items was a score of 2 
(a little). This was especially true regarding the statement that their thoughts were not an 
“accurate reflection of the way things ‘really’ are,” which suggests that like in Experiment 1, 
many participants were identified with their beliefs about the outgroup; that is, they found the 
stereotyped messages coming from the outgroup member as plausible and reflective of reality. 
Linguistic Intergroup Bias. I conducted a 2 (stimulus target’s group membership: 
ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (stimulus target’s behavior valence: positive vs. negative) × 3 
(attentional instructions: no instructions, immersion, or mindfulness) mixed factorial ANOVA; 
the first two variables were within-subjects. As in Experiment 1, the omnibus interaction effect 
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was non-significant, F(2, 262) = 1.06, p = .348, ηG2 = .001, ηP2 = .008. Figure 4 depicts the 
estimated means for this interaction (error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals). The two-way 
interaction between the target group membership and behavior valence was also non-significant, 
F(1, 262) = 2.43, p = .120, ηG2 = .002, ηP2 = .009, again suggesting that the LIB effect did not 
occur, even in the two control conditions. Subsequent contrast analyses confirmed this, though 
the pattern of means in the mindfulness condition was consistent with the LIB effect for both 
ingroup and outgroup (but none of those mean differences were statistically significant).  
There was a significant main effect of experimental condition, F(1, 262) = 3.69, p = .026, 
ηG2 = .014, ηP2 = .027. Tukey post-hoc contrasts showed that the significant difference was 
driven by the mean language abstraction score between the immersion and mindfulness 
condition, whereby independent of stimulus valence and target group, participants tended to give 
more abstract ratings in the mindfulness condition (M = 1.9, 95% CI [1.88, 2.08]) than in the 
immersion condition (M = 1.7, 95% CI [1.70, 1.90]), t(262) = -2.54, p = .031). While not 
necessarily theoretically meaningful, it is a surprising result considering that, if anything, one 
might have predicted more concrete scores in the mindfulness condition. 
Additionally, I conducted a separate repeated measures ANOVA with a single within-
subjects factor, stimulus block, to test whether responses differed between the first and second 
block of trials. The effect of stimulus block was not significant, F(1, 262) = 1.19, p = .276, nor 
did it interact with experimental condition. Thus, I could find no support for the hypothesis that 
the LIB effect was elicited during the first block of trials but dissipated during the second block. 
Other potential moderators, such as participant ingroup, prior meditation experience, trait 
mindfulness, SDO, and ingroup identification score did not reveal further theoretically 
meaningful or statistically significant effects for linguistic abstraction scores. 
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Infrahumanization. In general, the results for the Experiment 2 infrahumanization 
stimuli had an almost identical pattern and range of effect sizes as in Experiment 1. I initially 
conducted a 2 (target’s group membership: ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (emotion type: primary vs. 
secondary) × 2 (emotion valence: positive vs. negative) × 3 (attentional instructions: no 
instructions, immersion, or mindfulness) factorial ANOVA with repeated-measures on the first 
three variables. The main hypothesis of interest consisted of the three-way interaction among 
target group, emotion type, and attentional instructions (shown in Figure 5). However, none of 
the three-way interactions nor the four-way interaction were reliable, ps > .264. The two-way 
interaction between target group and emotion type was significant, F(1, 262) = 50.82, p < .001, 
ηG2 = .016, ηP2 = .162, with a similar pattern of means as in Experiment 1. Participants 
consistently rated the outgroup as having fewer secondary emotions than the ingroup (means of 
3.05  vs. 2.16, respectively), whereas they rated the outgroup as having more primary emotions 
than the ingroup (means of 2.82 vs. 2.36, respectively). Simple effects tests showed that the 
effect of target group was significant within only secondary emotions, F(1, 262) = 54.81, p < 
.001, ηG2 = .046, ηP2 = .173, as well as within only primary emotions, F(1, 262) = 15.53, p < 
.001, ηG2 = .012, ηP2 = .056. This 2-way interaction and results of simple effects tests is the same 
as found in Experiment 1. The main effect of target group was also significant, F(1, 262) = 9.27, 
p = .003, ηG2 = .005, ηP2 = .034. On average, and replicating Experiment 1’s result, participants 
attributed a greater number of emotions to the ingroup than the outgroup (means of 5.41 vs. 4.98, 
respectively). 
There were three significant effects associated with the valence of the emotions. The 
main effect of valence was significant, F(1, 262) = 60.48, p < .001, ηG2 = .025, ηP2 = .188. 
Across other factors, participants tended to select more positive than negative emotions. 
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However, two interactions qualified this effect. First, there was significant two-way interaction 
between emotion valence and target group, F(1, 262) = 147.9, p < .001, ηG2 = .093, ηP2 = .361. 
That is, participants attributed more positive emotions to their ingroup (M = 3.98 for ingroup and 
2.07 for outgroup) and more negative emotions to the outgroup (M = 1.43 for ingroup and 2.91 
for outgroup), independent of whether those emotions were primary or secondary in nature. 
Second, there was a significant two-way interaction between emotion valence and emotion type, 
F(1, 262) = 147.9, p < .001, ηG2 = .093, ηP2 = .361. Independent of target group, participants 
tended to select more negative primary emotions (M = 2.31) then negative secondary emotions 
(M = 2.03), and they tended to select fewer positive primary emotions (M = 2.87) than positive 
secondary emotions (M = 3.18). No other main effects or interactions were reliable, ps > .264. 
This pattern of results also replicated those observed in Experiment 1. 
When the participant’s political ingroup was added to the model, there were still no 
effects associated with the experimental manipulation. However, as in Experiment 1, the 
participant’s ingroup was found to moderate the infrahumanization effect. That is, the three-way 
interaction between the participant’s political ingroup, the target group, and the type of emotion 
was significant, though the effect size of this interaction was somewhat smaller than in 
Experiment 1, F(1, 259) = 28.38, p < .001, ηG2 = .008, ηP2 = .099. Inspection of the means for 
each group revealed that although conservative participants had very little differences in the 
average number of emotions they selected across the target group and emotion type, liberal 
participants’ distribution of emotions showed a reliable pattern of attributing more primary 
emotions and fewer secondary to the outgroup (conservatives) relative to the ingroup (liberals).  
This interaction was further qualified by a four-way interaction among the participant’s 
political ingroup, emotion valence, emotion type, and target group, though again the effect size 
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of this interaction was smaller than in Experiment 1, just bordering the significance threshold, 
F(1, 259) = 3.90, p = .0494, ηG2 = .0008, ηP2 = .015. The smaller interaction effect relative to 
Experiment 1 was due to a stronger tendency for conservative participants to infrahumanize 
liberals using positive emotions in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, though liberal 
participants still exhibited this effect in a much more pronounced way (see Figure 6).  
To decompose the four-way interaction, a simple effects tests were performed to examine 
how the two-way interaction between target group and emotion type varied as a function of 
emotion valence and the participant’s ingroup. For conservative participants, the two-way 
interaction between target group and emotion type was not significant for either positive 
emotions, F(1, 91) < 1, p = .46, ηG2 = .0006, ηP2 = .006, or for negative emotions, F(1, 55) < 1, p 
= .35, ηG2 = .001, ηP2 = .010. However, for liberal participants only, the two-way interaction 
between target group and emotion type was significant for both positive emotions, F(1, 172) = 
57.2, p < .001, ηG2 = .044, ηP2 = .249 and for negative emotions, F(1, 172) = 39.0, p < .001, ηG2 = 
.028, ηP2 = .185. Additional simple effects tests revealed that for liberal participants, the 
difference in how much they attributed primary and secondary emotions to the ingroup versus 
outgroup was significant in all cases except for negative secondary emotions (the latter not 
reaching significance after alpha correction for multiple tests). For example, for positive 
secondary emotions, liberals attributed significantly fewer emotions to the outgroup (M = 0.76) 
than the ingroup (M = 2.45), F(1, 172) = 193.7, p < .001, ηG2 = .031, ηP2 = .530 (this effect size 
was like that observed in Experiment 1 and was roughly five times larger than among 
conservative participants in Experiment 2, who had an effect size of ηP2 = .099 for the same 
comparison). Additionally, liberal participants attributed fewer positive primary emotions to 
conservatives, though the effect size was small, F(1, 172) = 17.6, p < .001, ηG2 = .031, ηP2 = 
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.093, and they attributed more negative primary emotions to conservatives F(1, 172) = 103.0, p < 
.001, ηG2 = .167, ηP2 = .375. 
The relationship between ingroup identification and infrahumanization that was observed 
in Experiment 1 was replicated in Experiment 2, F(1, 258) = 23.61, p < .001, ηG2 = .085, ηP2 = . 
085, b = 0.588. In other words, after controlling for the main effects and interactions among 
experimental condition and the participant’s ingroup, the main effect of ingroup identification 
explained 8.5% of the variance in the infrahumanization effect. This effect was not moderated by 
the participant’s political ingroup (i.e., the relationship was positive for both liberal and 
conservative participants) nor by whether the participant completed the ingroup identification 
scale at the beginning of the experiment versus at the end. Also, like in Experiment 1, the effect 
of the participant’s political ingroup on infrahumanization was still significant after controlling 
for each of the different covariates (i.e., meditation experience, trait mindfulness, SDO, and 
ingroup identification). 
In terms of the specific emotions that participants selected to characterize their ingroup 
and outgroup, patterns were like those observed in Experiment 1. Frequencies and percentages 
are listed in Table 6. Again, the words “rage” and fear” were commonly used by both groups to 
describe their respective outgroup. However, conservative participants also chose the words 
“love” and “friendliness” with a higher frequency to describe liberals than vice-versa. Liberals 
chose the words “cruelty” and “terror” to describe conservatives, whereas these words appear 
near the bottom of the list for conservatives’ ratings of liberals. 
Discussion 
 Despite the design improvements relative to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 resulted in an 
almost identical pattern of data. Moreover, the differences that did occur relative to Experiment 1 
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do not have clear theoretical implications. Given that the combined data from both experiments 
are comprised of a considerable number of participants, the pattern of results in terms of what 
replicated and what did not is striking; the LIB effect could not be reliably elicited, but both 
liberal and conservative participants displayed bias in terms of how they viewed the emotions of 
typical outgroup members. The mindfulness manipulation had no effect on this phenomenon and, 
if anything, it led to a pattern of more abstract linguistic scores that had means characteristic of 
the LIB effect in Experiment 2. 
 The pattern of data from manipulation checks was also similar to Experiment 1. While 
most participants reported having strong emotions in response to the stimuli and being able to 
follow the attention instructions, participants in the mindfulness condition did not necessarily 
show strong agreement with questions that asked them if they were curious about their 
experiences or took an open and decentered orientation to them (i.e., there was substantial 
variation in response to those items). Thus, the addition of the guided meditation slightly 
increased reported mindfulness relative to Experiment 1, but the difference was not substantial, 
at least according to the selected items from the Toronto Mindfulness Scale. 
 It is also interesting to note the lack of differences observed between the no-instruction 
and immersion control conditions, which was also true in Experiment 1. Since no clear pattern of 
means were observed between these two conditions, it leaves open the question of whether 
immersed attention represents what participants normally do (and so is no different from when 
explicit instructions are not provided) or whether the immersion instructions were simply not 
effective in these experiments. There is at least some evidence, however, that participants in the 
immersion condition did in fact have a more immersive experience with the stimuli. When asked 
whether they could “imagine the author of the paragraph speaking to me,” the mean level of 
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agreement on a 7-point Likert-type scale was 4.38 for participants in the no-instruction condition 
and 5.20 in the immersion condition, a significant difference, t(169.4) = -3.68, p < .001. 
Interestingly, the mean response in the mindfulness condition was also 5.20, suggesting that 
those participants were also immersed in the stimuli to a similar degree. 
General Discussion 
 Donald Campbell once wrote that, “the absence of the norms and practices of 
replication…makes it theoretically predictable that the social disciplines will make little progress 
(Campbell, 1986, p. 122). While increasing numbers of social psychologists are beginning to 
agree with that insight, a significant obstacle to making replication more normative is the 
ambiguity that results from a failed replication attempt. If an attempted replication fails to 
produce the same results as the original research, how can we know what, exactly, failed? 
Indeed, this is not just a problem for replications, but for null results more broadly. Paul Meehl 
has summarized the dilemma that null results in the context of weakly-specified theory-testing 
and reliance on directional significance tests can have for social science practice:  
It is not unusual that…ad hoc challenging of auxiliary hypotheses is repeated in the 
course of a series of related experiments, in which the auxiliary hypothesis involved in 
Experiment 1…becomes the focus of interest in Experiment 2, which in turn utilizes 
further plausible but easily challenged auxiliary hypotheses, and so forth. In this fashion a 
zealous and clever investigator can slowly wend his way through a tenuous nomological 
network, performing a long series of related experiments which appear to the uncritical 
reader as a fine example of “an integrated research program,” without ever once refuting 
or corroborating so much as a single strand of the network (Meehl, 1967, p. 114, italics 
in original). 
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The challenge, then, in the present two experiments—and in all failed replication 
attempts—is how to know where in the chain of causal and auxiliary hypotheses did the failure 
occur (Earp & Trafimow, 2015). In other words, were the substantive hypotheses refuted, or 
could the null results be blamed on something else? Was one (or more) of my methodological 
changes from the Tincher et al. (2016) experiment responsible for the lack of replication? Was it, 
for example, that political ideology was simply not salient or important enough of an intergroup 
context for college undergraduates to elicit the LIB effect? Was there something about the 
stimuli or procedure that compromised internal or construct validity? Was the construct of 
“mindfulness,” for example, not sufficiently operationalized and manipulated? Is it even possible 
to do so in a brief laboratory experiment, or are researchers being too optimistic by thinking that 
they can provide a five- or ten-minute set of attentional instructions and produce a different state 
of mind in the participant, one that often takes years of dedicated practice to achieve in the real 
world? Are instruments that are alleged to measure implicit intergroup phenomena such as the 
LIB and infrahumanization themselves fraught with inconsistent effects and potential file 
drawers of unpublished null findings? Unfortunately, these two experiments offer little insight 
into these questions, leaving room to either craft new experiments that focus on these auxiliary 
hypotheses directly, or simply leave the questions open and move on to something else. In either 
case, the lower likelihood of being able to publish null findings in peer-reviewed journals 
contributes to a skewed and potentially inaccurate scientific record because it leaves open the 
question of whether prior positive published findings are reliable or are simply the result of 
capitalization on chance and changing norms of what constitutes questionable research 
practices.5 Indeed, this is the crux of the current replication crisis in social psychology. 
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Apart from the substantive hypotheses, however, the experiments here suggested two 
compelling and replicable aspects of political bias. First, this research adds further support to the 
claim that bias exists on both sides of the political spectrum and can be characterized by a failure 
to distinguish between who the people on the other side are (i.e., what emotions they have as 
human beings) and what they believe (i.e., the fact that they have particular political beliefs or 
behaviors). This is the essence of psychological essentialism, the belief that others are 
constitutionally different kinds of human beings. Indeed, perhaps they aren’t even quite as 
“human” as we are. During a time of particularly pronounced political polarization in the United 
States and elsewhere, it is disturbing to note how easy it can be to assume that one’s political 
adversaries inherently feel more rage, fear, cruelty, terror, and shame than we do. Whether held 
consciously or unconsciously, those assumptions may very well influence how messages are sent 
and received, or how behavior is interpreted, between group members, and may have self-
fulfilling and self-perpetuating consequences. 
But the experiments revealed another perhaps more surprising result: that liberal 
participants were more biased against conservatives than vice versa, even when controlling for 
within-group degree of political identification. This finding contradicts a substantial empirical 
record which suggests that liberals are the more tolerant and cognitively flexible of the two 
political variants, at least in the United States (for a thorough review, see Jost, 2017). However, 
there are reasons to think that the past empirical record on this issue could itself be biased, or at 
least limited. Recent scholarship suggests that ideological context matters when assessing 
phenomena such as political intolerance and prejudice, and that both liberals and conservatives 
can show very similar propensities for bias and intolerance when confronted with “ideologically 
objectionable” circumstances (Crawford, 2009; Crawford et al., 2013; Crawford & Pilanski, 
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2014). These scholars point out, for example, that motivated reasoning, feelings of righteousness, 
and perceptual inaccuracy are not limited to any political group (Haidt, 2012). For example, 
Graham, Nosek, and Haidt (2012) found that not only did both liberals and conservatives tend to 
exaggerate their actual intergroup differences of moral concerns, but that liberals were the least 
accurate about both groups.  
Further, the motivational and cognitive antecedents of left-right political orientation can 
be context-specific, so what is “ideologically objectionable” in one place, time, or context may 
not be in another (Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007). For example, this research was 
undertaken during a time of conservative and “alt-right” ascendency in the United States, with an 
unlikely and highly-unpopular president having just been elected and a Republican majority in 
both houses of Congress. It is plausible that in this context, conservative participants’ needs were 
being met such that intergroup bias was not manifest in their behavior, whereas the exact 
opposite was true for liberal participants. 
On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that political ideology is both explicitly and 
implicitly connected to public policy and the law. In other words, liberals and conservatives are 
associated with distinct types of policy positions, and those positions can be shown to have 
objective, “real-world” effects in the everyday lives of groups of people. Sometimes those effects 
are harmful. Consequently, another way to understand the intergroup bias in these experiments, 
especially on the part of liberal participants, is to question whether it represents “bias” at all, but 
rather convictions about the effects of ideology, or even observations of liberal and conservative 
politicians’ emotional expressions. Perhaps mindfulness did not affect differential attribution of 
emotions because even when liberals become more mindful of their thoughts and feelings, they 
remain convinced that conservatives act from feelings of fear, terror, and cruelty. One might ask, 
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then, when it comes to political conviction, what exactly would we expect a “decentered” 
perspective to result in? Does lack of “bias” imply an acceptance of behavior or harmful social 
policy? Or is it rather that mindfulness should allow one to have a less biased perception of who 
an outgroup member is as a person, while still being able to maintain an opposition to harmful 
behaviors and policies? 
A further objection to the “liberal bias” interpretation of these findings relates to the 
measure of infrahumanization that was used in these experiments. That is, one could argue that 
the emotion/trait words used to measure the infrahumanization effect in these experiments were 
confounded with common political stereotypes that liberals and conservatives have of each other. 
It is plausible, for example, that while conservative participants were able to select words like 
“love” and “friendliness” to describe liberals—aligning with the “bleeding heart” liberal 
stereotype—liberals did not have similar stereotype-consistent positive, secondary emotion 
words to apply to conservatives. Thus, what appeared to be asymmetrical infrahumanization may 
have simply been a function of the words each group had available to choose from. Moreover, 
the classification of “primary” and “secondary” emotions for the words used in these 
experiments is based on relatively sparse normative data collected from non-U.S. samples 
(Paladino et al., 2002). While the general lay distinction between primary and secondary 
emotions seems to be a cross-culturally robust finding, semantic differences among languages 
can create translation issues for specific emotion words and this, in turn, can create a challenge to 
construct validity (Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2001; Leyens et al., 2003; Leyens et al., 
2007; Paladino et al., 2002). Thus, for example, using a word such as “cruelty” to signify an 
emotion may have been a suboptimal aspect of the measure, since such words are arguably more 
like trait attributions than emotional ones. 
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Limitations, Future Directions, and Concluding Remarks 
 As suggested above, the two experiments in this research were not without their own 
limitations. For example, given that participants’ political ingroup was found to moderate the 
infrahumanization effect, it would have been better to have a balanced design with equal 
numbers of conservative and liberal participants. This would have made for cleaner analyses and 
more precise parameter estimates, especially for the conservative group. But more broadly, the 
design would have benefited from the ability for participants to choose from among a set of 
groups or issues which one they cared the most about (e.g., pro-life vs. pro-choice, ethnicity, 
religion, etc.). The experiment could then have been individually tailored to each participant’s 
most meaningful intergroup context. 
It would be also useful to further explore emotional perceptions of political outgroups, 
testing to see whether the asymmetrical bias in infrahumanization that was observed in these 
experiments is a robust and reproducible finding. A further extension would be to compare 
political ingroup members’ perceptions of outgroup emotions to actual outgroup self-reports. 
There is some evidence to suggest, for example, that political partisans exhibit different 
emotional profiles when considering themselves as members of their political group (Seger, 
Smith, Kinias, & Mackie, 2009; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). Might some degree of political 
intergroup hostility be accounted for by mutual discomfort with the outgroup’s typical emotional 
expression?  In such investigations, care should be taken to avoid potential measurement 
confounds by including a wider range of emotions and traits (i.e., to allow the disentangling of 
stereotype content from other processes such as infrahumanization). 
A further aspect of the design that was suboptimal was the measurement of trait 
mindfulness at the end of the experiment rather than at some prior time, such as during the 
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prescreening survey. Including the measurement at the end of the experiment left open the 
possibility that the experiment itself may have biased the measurement. 
 Finally, it would be helpful to extend this paradigm to other populations besides college 
undergraduates, and to explore other means of inducing mindfulness, such as longer or repeated 
sessions, using recordings from actual meditation teachers, or creating more interactive 
exercises, such as allowing participants to write down their thoughts and then reflect on them. 
One of the biggest challenges of this research was knowing whether mindfulness was 
successfully induced and, if so, to what degree and duration. It is difficult to conceive of a non-
reactive measure for assessing state-mindfulness since calling attention to one’s experiences can 
itself influence the person’s attention (this is why the Toronto Mindfulness Scale was not used in 
the two control conditions). Even if we can assume that mindfulness was induced, how this 
manifested in terms of differences in cognitive processing is far from clear. Thus, another helpful 
extension would be to include more neuro-psychological measures along with self-report. 
 If the essence of mindful attention is indeed “observing without evaluating,” as 
Krishnamurti suggested, then one thing seems clear: it is a rare skill indeed. The promise of 
interpersonal and intergroup mindfulness is that it allows one to make clearer distinctions 
between the basic humanity of the other versus their behaviors and beliefs. But it remains to be 
seen whether, and to what extent, this skill might be transformative for intergroup relations.  
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Footnotes
1 See Sedlmeier et al. (2012) and Gotink et al. (2015) for meta-analyses that include a 
combined 278 relevant experimental studies, but compare to another recent meta-analysis 
including 47 studies that showed more mixed results (Goyal et al., 2014). It is worth noting that 
one of the main conclusions of such meta-analyses is that, while mindfulness-based interventions 
seem efficacious overall, the majority of empirical work has methodological weaknesses and 
high variability in operational definitions and measures, which make causal inference or cross-
study comparison difficult. Indeed, meta-analyses to date have had to exclude the majority of 
existing research. 
2 Berry & Brown’s (2017) chapter also reviews studies that used other forms of 
meditation, such as loving-kindness meditation. While these meditative practices share much in 
common with mindfulness meditation—they almost certainly involve some cultivation of 
mindfulness—they are also distinct enough from basic mindfulness in their aims and form that 
they are not considered here. 
3 I subsequently ran a model that also included the participant’s ingroup (liberal or 
conservative) and the LIB stimulus set version that the participant viewed (set A or B), but 
neither of these factors contributed to variance in the dependent measure and were therefore 
excluded from further analyses. 
4 In Experiment 2, a continuous measure of political identification was used as an 
eligibility filter. The question had the same wording as in Experiment 1, but this time the 
response scale was a continuous slider that yielded values from 1.00 (extremely liberal) to 7.00 
(extremely conservative). Participants who scored below 3.00 or above 4.50 were eligible for the 
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study (a larger criterion window was used for the conservative end of the scale due to the limited 
number of conservatives in the student population). While this was not an ideal design choice, 
statistical controls were used in data analysis to ensure that any sampling bias introduced by this 
procedure would not bias statistical inference. 
5 To be fair, there are many indications that this is changing, though the change is slow 
and not evenly distributed among subfields and journals. The American Psychological 
Association, for example, now has standardized protocols for preregistering replication attempts  
with peer-reviewed designs, and the results are published regardless of outcome.  
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Table 1 
Experiment 1: Descriptive statistics for covariate measures 
 n Yes No  
  f % f %  
Prior meditation experience 206 73 35.3 133 64.3  
       
       
 n M SD Mdn Min Max 
Length of meditation experience (years) 73 3.16 1.87 3.00 1 6 
Composite trait mindfulness score 207 3.26 0.37 3.25 2.04 4.21 
Composite ingroup identification score 207 4.68 0.82 4.71 2.43 6.64 
Composite SDO score 203 2.12 0.99 2.00 1.00 5.00 
 
 
MINDFULNESS AND POLITICAL INTERGROUP BIAS 75 
Table 2 
Experiment 1: Descriptive statistics for manipulation check items 
Item # Item text n M SD Mdn Min Max 
1 I was curious about my reactions to things. 69 2.80 0.95 3.00 1 4.5 
2 I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings that I was having. 69 2.90 0.97 3.00 1 5 
3 I was more concerned with being open to my experiences than controlling or 
changing them. 
69 2.88 0.87 2.50 1 5 
4 I experienced my thoughts more as events in my mind than as a necessarily 
accurate reflection of the way things ‘really’ are. 
69 2.63 0.90 2.50 1 5 
5 To what extent were you able to continuously pay attention to the pictures? 70 4.19 0.91 4.00 1 5 
6 To what extent did you have strong feelings while looking at the pictures? 68 3.57 1.01 4.00 1 5 
7 To what extent do you feel like you were able to continuously follow the 
instructions that were provided? 
137 3.89 0.87 4.00 1 5 
8 How easy or difficult was it to follow the instructions? 137 3.83 1.03 4.00 1.5 5 
9 I understood what the paragraph was about. 207 6.05 0.99 6.00 1 7 
10 I found the paragraph kind of boring. 206 2.95 1.39 2.00 1 7 
11 I felt strong feelings as I read the paragraph. 207 5.49 1.31 6.00 1 7 
12 I could imagine the author of the paragraph speaking to me. 207 4.98 1.53 5.00 1 7 
Note. Items 1-4 were taken from the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (Lau et al., 2006) and were only asked of those in the mindfulness 
condition; response options ranged from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Items 5 and 6 were asked of participants in the control (no 
attentional instruction) condition, and response options ranged from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Items 7 and 8 were asked of 
participants in the immersed-attention and mindfulness condition; response options for item 7 ranged from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very 
much), and response options for item 8 ranged from 1 (very difficult) to 5 (very easy). Items 9-12 were asked of all participants, and 
response options ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Note that items 1-4 and items 7-8 were asked at two 
different times: after participants viewed the political/social photographs, and after they read the disparaging political paragraph. The 
descriptive statistics presented above for those items represent the average score from those two responses. 
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Table 3 
Experiment 1: Frequencies of emotions selected to describe participants’ ingroup and outgroup 
 Conservatives        Liberals      
 Emotion Type Outgroup Ingroup   Emotion  Outgroup Ingroup 
   f % f %     f % f % 
 Rage Primary 33 8.6% 15 3.9%   Rage Primary 94 11.5% 31 3.2% 
* Love Secondary 32 8.3% 34 8.9%   Fear Primary 79 9.6% 55 5.7% 
 Fear Primary 32 8.3% 21 5.5%  * Desire Primary 65 7.9% 60 6.2% 
* Friendliness Secondary 32 8.3% 36 9.4%   Cruelty Primary 62 7.6% 12 1.2% 
* Desire Primary 30 7.8% 36 9.4%   Disappointment Secondary 60 7.3% 39 4.0% 
 Disappointment Secondary 26 6.8% 15 3.9%   Terror Primary 53 6.5% 17 1.8% 
* Pleasure Primary 23 6.0% 27 7.1%  * Enjoyment Primary 43 5.2% 70 7.2% 
 Shame Secondary 18 4.7% 12 3.1%  * Pleasure Primary 42 5.1% 59 6.1% 
 Pain Primary 16 4.2% 13 3.4%   Shame Secondary 40 4.9% 19 2.0% 
 Despair Secondary 16 4.2% 8 2.1%  * Friendliness Secondary 39 4.8% 122 12.6% 
* Attraction Primary 15 3.9% 18 4.7%   Despair Secondary 34 4.1% 30 3.1% 
 Guilt Secondary 15 3.9% 12 3.1%  * Love Secondary 32 3.9% 117 12.1% 
* Enjoyment Primary 14 3.6% 32 8.4%   Pain Primary 30 3.7% 33 3.4% 
 Terror Primary 14 3.6% 6 1.6%   Remorse Secondary 29 3.5% 38 3.9% 
* Fondness Secondary 14 3.6% 26 6.8%  * Surprise Primary 25 3.0% 30 3.1% 
* Amazement Secondary 13 3.4% 24 6.3%  * Fondness Secondary 21 2.6% 68 7.0% 
* Surprise Primary 12 3.1% 14 3.7%  * Amazement Secondary 21 2.6% 41 4.2% 
 Remorse Secondary 12 3.1% 13 3.4%  * Attraction Primary 20 2.4% 34 3.5% 
* Serenity Secondary 9 2.3% 8 2.1%   Guilt Secondary 19 2.3% 32 3.3% 
 Cruelty Primary 8 2.1% 11 2.9%  * Serenity Secondary 12 1.5% 59 6.1% 
Note. The left-most set of columns represent conservative participants’ responses, and the right-most set of columns represent liberal 
participants’ responses. Both sets of responses are sorted by the highest-frequency emotions attributed to the outgroup. Secondary 
emotions are listed in bold font and positive emotions are designated with asterisks.
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Table 4 
Experiment 2: Descriptive statistics for covariate measures 
 n Yes No  
  f % f %  
Prior meditation experience 265 96 36.2 169 63.8  
       
       
 n M SD Mdn Min Max 
Length of meditation experience (years) 95 2.74 1.77 3.00 1.00 6.00 
Composite trait mindfulness score 265 3.25 0.40 3.25 2.13 4.46 
Composite ingroup identification score 265 4.73 0.88 4.71 2.43 7.00 
Composite SDO score 261 2.12 0.98 2.00 1.00 6.00 
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Table 5 
Experiment 2: Descriptive statistics for manipulation check items 
Item # Question text n M SD Mdn Min Max 
1 I was curious about my reactions to things. 88 3.10 0.95 3.00 1 5 
2 I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings that I was having. 88 3.00 0.90 3.00 1 5 
3 I was more concerned with being open to my experiences than controlling or 
changing them. 
88 3.18 0.90 3.00 1 5 
4 I experienced my thoughts more as events in my mind than as a necessarily 
accurate reflection of the way things ‘really’ are. 
88 2.99 0.75 3.00 1 4.5 
5 To what extent were you able to continuously pay attention to the audio clip? 88 4.35 0.66 4.00 3 5 
6 To what extent did you have strong feelings while listening to the audio clip? 88 3.09 1.02 3.00 1 5 
7 To what extent do you feel like you were able to continuously follow the 
instructions that were provided? 
177 4.28 0.68 4.50 2 5 
8 How easy or difficult was it to follow the instructions? 177 4.36 0.82 4.50 1.5 5 
9 I understood what the paragraph was about. 265 6.13 1.07 6.00 1 7 
10 I found the paragraph kind of boring. 265 2.99 1.43 3.00 1 7 
11 I felt strong feelings as I read the paragraph. 265 5.60 1.41 6.00 1 7 
12 I could imagine the author of the paragraph speaking to me. 264 4.93 1.56 5.00 1 7 
Note. Items 1-4 were taken from the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (Lau et al., 2006) and were only asked of those in the mindfulness 
condition; response options ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Items 5 and 6 were asked of participants in the control (no 
attentional instruction) condition, and response options ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). Items 7 and 8 were asked of 
participants in the immersed-attention and mindfulness condition; response options for item 7 ranged from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very 
much), and response options for item 8 ranged from 1 (very difficult) to 5 (very easy). Items 9-12 were asked of all participants, and 
response options ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Note that items 1-4 and items 7-8 were asked at two 
different times: after participants viewed the political/social photographs, and after they read the disparaging political paragraph. The 
descriptive statistics presented above for those items represent the average score from those two responses. 
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Table 6 
Experiment 2: Frequencies of emotions selected to describe participants’ ingroup and outgroup 
 Conservatives        Liberals      
 Emotion Type Outgroup Ingroup   Emotion  Outgroup Ingroup 
   f % f %     f % f % 
 Fear Primary 47 9.5% 15 3.3%   Rage Primary 96 11.7% 29 3.0% 
 Rage Primary 42 8.5% 23 5.0%   Cruelty Primary 73 8.9% 5 0.5% 
* Desire Primary 42 8.5% 47 10.2%   Disappointment Secondary 71 8.6% 47 4.8% 
 Disappointment Secondary 40 8.0% 21 4.6%  * Desire Primary 66 8.0% 86 8.8% 
* Friendliness Secondary 39 7.8% 54 11.7%   Fear Primary 60 7.3% 34 3.5% 
* Love Secondary 37 7.4% 36 7.8%  * Enjoyment Primary 51 6.2% 73 7.5% 
 Shame Secondary 27 5.4% 13 2.8%   Terror Primary 45 5.5% 13 1.3% 
 Remorse Secondary 25 5.0% 9 2.0%   Shame Secondary 43 5.2% 21 2.2% 
* Enjoyment Primary 22 4.4% 45 9.8%  * Pleasure Primary 40 4.9% 59 6.1% 
 Despair Secondary 22 4.4% 8 1.7%  * Friendliness Secondary 38 4.6% 142 14.6% 
 Pain Primary 22 4.4% 9 2.0%  * Love Secondary 31 3.8% 120 12.3% 
 Terror Primary 21 4.2% 5 1.1%   Guilt Secondary 29 3.5% 23 2.4% 
 Guilt Secondary 18 3.6% 9 2.0%   Remorse Secondary 27 3.3% 39 4.0% 
* Fondness Secondary 16 3.2% 33 7.2%  * Fondness Secondary 26 3.2% 66 6.8% 
 Cruelty Primary 16 3.2% 8 1.7%   Pain Primary 24 2.9% 26 2.7% 
* Pleasure Primary 15 3.0% 37 8.0%   Despair Secondary 23 2.8% 22 2.3% 
* Surprise Primary 13 2.6% 13 2.8%  * Surprise Primary 22 2.7% 27 2.8% 
* Amazement Secondary 13 2.6% 33 7.2%  * Attraction Primary 21 2.6% 45 4.6% 
* Serenity Secondary 11 2.2% 15 3.3%  * Amazement Secondary 20 2.4% 47 4.8% 
* Attraction Primary 9 1.8% 27 5.9%  * Serenity Secondary 16 1.9% 49 5.0% 
Note. The left-most set of columns represent conservative participants’ responses, and the right-most set of columns represent liberal 
participants’ responses. Both sets of responses are sorted by the highest-frequency emotions attributed to the outgroup. Secondary 
emotions are listed in bold font and positive emotions are designated with asterisks.  
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Figure 1. Experiment 1 average linguistic abstraction scores by stimulus target group 
membership, stimulus target behavior valence, and experimental condition. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 2. Experiment 1 average number of emotions selected by target group membership, 
emotion type, and experimental condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Note 
that in each trial—ingroup target or outgroup target—participants could select a maximum of 20 
emotions. However, this graph depicts the within-trial factor of emotion type (primary or 
secondary), and within that factor a maximum of 10 emotions could be selected per cell. 
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Figure 3. Experiment 1 average number of emotions selected by target group membership, 
emotion type, and participant ingroup. The top panel shows data for only positive emotions 
whereas the bottom panel shows data for only negative emotions. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. Note that in each trial—ingroup target or outgroup target—participants 
could select a maximum of 20 emotions. However, these graphs depict the within-trial factors of 
emotion valence (positive or negative) and emotion type (primary or secondary), and within 
those factors, a maximum of 5 emotions could be selected per cell. 
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Figure 4. Experiment 2 average linguistic abstraction scores by stimulus target group 
membership, stimulus target behavior valence, and experimental condition. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 5. Experiment 2 average number of emotions selected by target group membership, 
emotion type, and experimental condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Note 
that in each trial—ingroup target or outgroup target—participants could select a maximum of 20 
emotions. However, this graph depicts the within-trial factor of emotion type (primary or 
secondary), and within that factor a maximum of 10 emotions could be selected per cell. 
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Figure 6. Experiment 2 average number of emotions selected by target group membership, 
emotion type, and participant ingroup. The top panel shows data for only positive emotions 
whereas the bottom panel shows data for only negative emotions. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. Note that in each trial—ingroup target or outgroup target—participants 
could select a maximum of 20 emotions. However, these graphs depict the within-trial factors of 
emotion valence (positive or negative) and emotion type (primary or secondary), and within 
those factors, a maximum of 5 emotions could be selected per cell. 
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Appendix A 
Experiment 1 instructions for attention manipulation (adapted from Tincher et al., 2016) 
 
Mindful Attention Instructions: 
We would now like to provide you with some instructions to follow for the next part of the 
study. You will shortly be presented with a series of pictures. We would like you to view and 
think about these pictures using the “observing perspective.” 
 
• First, observe the thoughts and other reactions you have about these scenes. As you have 
a specific thought or reaction, you’ll notice that it first arises, and then it dissipates - 
similar to how waves arise on the ocean and then dissipate.  
• Second, understand that these thoughts and reactions are just transitory, fleeting mental 
states. These fleeting mental states may include thoughts about the scene, internal bodily 
reactions, emotional reactions, and so forth. 
  
What’s different about this “observing” perspective is that you experience your thoughts and 
reactions about the scene as fleeting mental states. You remain aware that they’re just thoughts 
and reactions as you are sitting here in the room. In summary, when you use the “observing 
perspective” rather than live out the event, you simply observe your thoughts and reactions to it 
in the present moment. As you notice your thoughts and reactions to the events in the scenes, 
please don’t try to avoid or suppress them. Just remain aware that they’re thoughts and reactions, 
and observe them as mental states that arise and dissipate.  
 
Immersion Instructions: 
We would now like to provide you with some instructions to follow for the next part of the 
study.  You will shortly be presented with a series of pictures. We would like you to view and 
think about these pictures by completely immersing yourself in them. When you completely 
“immerse yourself” in an event, you live the experience. You travel in time to the event. You 
project yourself into it. It seems like you’re actually there. It’s as if the event were happening in 
the moment. When you completely “immerse yourself” in an event, you also often experience it 
in vivid detail that might include: 
  
• Colors, sounds, smells, and other sensory aspects of being there in the situation 
• Emotions and feelings that arise while living the event 
• Physical sensations and bodily states that also arise while living the event, such as your 
heartbeat, an adrenaline rush, tightening of the chest, feeling tense, faster breathing, or 
calming sensations such as slower breathing or relaxation 
• You might seem to hear what yourself and other people are saying in the situation   
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In summary, when you completely “immerse yourself” in an event, it’s as if you were having a 
vivid daydream that you enter and live to the fullest. As a result of living the event in vivid 
detail, it almost seems real to you. You experience it almost as if it were actually happening.   
 
No Instructions Condition: 
Now we will show you a series of pictures. After viewing the pictures, we will ask you a few 
questions about your experience of viewing them.  
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Appendix B 
Experiment 1 political ingroup threat paragraphs 
 
[Displayed to all participants]: We would now like you to read the following statement and 
provide us with feedback on how it makes you feel. 
 
[For non-control experimental condition participants only]: As you read it, please remember to 
continue to [apply the “observing perspective” / completely immerse yourself in the text]. That 
is, remember to [notice your thoughts and reactions to the words, trying not to avoid or suppress 
them. Just remain aware that they’re thoughts and reactions, and observe them as mental states 
that arise and dissipate. / try and live the experience by projecting yourself into it and 
experiencing it in vivid detail. You experience it almost as if it someone were actually speaking 
to you right now.] 
 
[Displayed to liberals only]: Liberals might be educated, but they are incredibly naïve. They 
don’t appreciate the threats we face as a country, and most of them have never had to work hard 
for anything. Liberals don’t really stand for anything; they posture being all about justice but are 
really just about what makes them feel good. They tend to be arrogant, probably because their 
parents spoiled them rotten. They seem to only care about themselves, or people who think like 
them. We are facing social collapse and the erosion of American values, and liberals are 
continually making these problems worse. Liberals think they are in the right, but they are 
hurting our country. 
 
[Displayed to conservatives only]: Education has been wasted on conservatives; any facts that 
don’t fit their cause are disregarded or feed into their paranoia. They don’t appreciate the 
hardships people face in our country, and most of them never have had to work hard for 
anything. Conservatives don’t really stand for anything other than bigotry and fear-mongering. 
They tend to be full of fear, probably because of abusive or domineering parents. They seem to 
only care about themselves, or people who look like them. We are facing environmental collapse 
and the erosion of human rights, and conservatives are continually making these problems worse. 
Conservatives think they are in the right, but they are hurting our country. 
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Appendix C 
Experiment 1 Linguistic Intergroup Bias stimuli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) A is walking an elderly person across the road.   1) A is picking up trash. 
2) A is helping an elderly person across the road.   2) A is looking after the park. 
3) A cares for elderly people.      3) A respects nature. 
4) A is caring.        4) A is conscientious. 
 
  
  Person A is a liberal/conservative. Person A is a liberal/conservative. 
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1) A is picking up the other person     1) A is running. 
2) A is helping the other person.     2) A is training. 
3) A is concerned about the other person.    3) A loves sports. 
4) A is considerate.       4) A is athletic. 
 
 
  
Person A is a liberal/conservative. Person A is a liberal/conservative. 
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1) A is telling a sexist joke.     1) A is throwing trash on the ground. 
2) A is spreading a sexist joke.    2) A is littering the park. 
3) A enjoys sexist humor.     3) A disrespects nature. 
4) A is sexist.       4) A is disrespectful. 
  
Person A is a liberal/conservative. Person A is a liberal/conservative. 
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1) A is spray-painting the wall.    1) A is hitting the other person. 
2) A is vandalizing the wall.     2) A is hurting the other person. 
3) A doesn’t care about other people’s property  3) A hates the other person. 
4) A is destructive.      4) A is aggressive. 
  
Person A is a liberal/conservative. Person A is a liberal/conservative. 
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Appendix D 
Experiment 2 Linguistic Intergroup Bias stimuli  
 
 
 
 
 
1) A is walking an elderly person across the road.   1) A is picking up trash. 
2) A is helping an elderly person across the road.   2) A is looking after the park. 
3) A cares for elderly people.      3) A respects nature. 
4) A is caring.        4) A is conscientious. 
 
  
Person A is a liberal/conservative. 
Person A is a liberal/conservative. 
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1) A is picking up the other person     1) A is writing notes. 
2) A is helping the other person.     2) A is studying. 
3) A is concerned about the other person.    3) A enjoys studying. 
4) A is considerate.       4) A is motivated. 
 
 
  
Person A is a liberal/conservative. Person A is a liberal/conservative. 
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1) A is looking at someone’s answers.   1) A is throwing trash on the ground. 
2) A is cheating on a test.     2) A is littering the road. 
3) A doesn’t care about cheating on tests   3) A disrespects nature. 
4) A is dishonest      4) A is disrespectful. 
  
Person A is a liberal/conservative. Person A is a liberal/conservative. 
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1) A is spray-painting the wall.    1) A is hitting the other person. 
2) A is vandalizing the wall.     2) A is hurting the other person. 
3) A doesn’t care about other people’s property  3) A hates the other person. 
4) A is destructive.      4) A is aggressive. 
  
Person A is a liberal/conservative. 
Person A is a liberal/conservative. 
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Appendix E 
Experiment 2 instructions for attention manipulation (adapted from Tincher et al., 2016) 
 
Mindful Attention Instructions: 
We would now like to provide you with some instructions to follow for the next part of the 
study. 
  
On the next screen, we will play a short audio clip. We would like you to close your eyes while 
you listen, and use what we call the "observing perspective."   
  
• First, observe the thoughts and other reactions that you have about the clip.  As you have 
a specific thought or reaction, you’ll notice that it first arises, and then it changes in some 
way, or fades away altogether - similar to how waves arise on the ocean and then fade 
away. 
• Second, understand that these thoughts and reactions are just temporary, fleeting mental 
states.  These fleeting mental states may include thoughts about the clip, internal bodily 
reactions, emotional reactions, and so forth.   
  
What’s different about this “observing” perspective is that you experience your thoughts and 
reactions about the clip as changing mental states.  You remain aware that they’re just thoughts 
and reactions as you are listening.  In summary, when you use the “observing perspective” rather 
than live out the event, you simply observe your thoughts and reactions to it in the present 
moment.  As you notice your thoughts and reactions to the events in the clip, please don’t try to 
avoid or suppress them.  Just remain aware that they’re thoughts and reactions, and observe them 
as mental states that arise and fade. 
  
We will ask you to practice this observing perspective as you listen, and then guide you through 
an interactive practice right after the audio clip is done playing.   
 
Immersion Instructions: 
We would now like to provide you with some instructions to follow for the next part of the 
study. 
  
On the next screen, we will play a short audio clip. We would like you to close your eyes while 
you listen, and completely immerse yourself in the audio clip. When you completely “immerse 
yourself” in an event, you live the experience. You travel in time to the event. You project 
yourself into it. It seems like you’re actually there. It’s as if the event were happening in the 
moment. When you completely “immerse yourself” in an event, you also often experience it in 
vivid detail that might include: 
  
• Colors, sounds, smells, and other sensory aspects of being there in the situation 
• Emotions and feelings that arise while living the event 
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• Physical sensations and bodily states that also arise while living the event, such as your 
heartbeat, an adrenaline rush, tightening of the chest, feeling tense, faster breathing, or 
calming sensations such as slower breathing or relaxation 
• You might seem to hear what yourself and other people are saying in the situation   
  
In summary, when you completely “immerse yourself” in an event, it’s as if you were having a 
vivid daydream that you enter and live to the fullest. As a result of living the event in vivid 
detail, it almost seems real to you. You experience it almost as if it were actually happening.   
 
 
No Instructions Condition: 
We will now play a short audio clip. We would like you to close your eyes while you listen to 
the clip. After listening, we will ask you a few questions about your experience. 
 
After Shark Attack Audio Clip Ends (mindful attention condition only): 
Now, please briefly close your eyes again and take a few moments now to observe any thoughts 
and other reactions you are having in this moment, whether about the audio clip you just heard or 
anything else. [Pause] 
Scan through your body and notice any sensations. [Pause] 
Notice any sounds in the room you are in or that are outside. [Pause] 
Notice any distinct feelings or thoughts you are having.  [Pause] 
And as you notice these things, also notice that all of these experiences arise and change or fade 
away on their own. They are not permanent, but are rather part of a constantly changing 
landscape of experiences. [Pause] 
You can now open your eyes and press the arrow button when you are ready to continue. 
